

FISCAL POLICY, TAXATION AND GENDER EQUALITY IN JORDAN

Recommendations to the
Government of Jordan

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Manufactured in Jordan

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Jordanian economy faces a challenging task: reversing the slow growth trend in a context of already high public debt, while simultaneously addressing the structural problem of very low labor force participation and high unemployment. The urgency of these policy objectives become even clearer considering the fragile regional situation where Jordan has become home to refugees corresponding to one-fifth of its population. There is an overwhelming consensus amongst all stakeholders in Jordan and its international partners that the goal of macroeconomic policy reforms is not simply growth; rather inclusive, equitable growth and that narrowing the gender employment gap needs to be one of the main elements of such a strategy. Jordan has the third lowest female labor force participation rate globally (after Yemen and Syria) at around 15% as of 2018. For working age adults (25-54), the gender employment gap stands at a staggering 53 percentage points (18.2% women versus 71.2% of prime men in this age group are employed).

While the consensus in the policy circles on urgency of improving women's employment provides a solid basis for action, the current macroeconomic policy reforms in Jordan entail a stabilization program based on tough austerity measures along with a structural adjustment program entailing labor market flexibilization. This standard mainstream policy package has long been critiqued elsewhere for placing a disproportionately heavy burden on the socioeconomically disadvantaged groups including women. The current reform program in Jordan claims that any negative redistributive outcomes are being addressed through complementary measures on social safety nets and fine-tuning of austerity sub-components such as the tax reform so as to minimize any negative effects on the most vulnerable groups. Against this background, this report provides a gender assessment of the on-going fiscal policy reforms, with a particular focus on the recent changes in taxation, which entail lowering of exemption thresholds and increasing of tax rates on personal income tax as well as increases in the general sales tax.

A critical review of gendered labor market patterns shows that women's employment rate is very low and stagnating over the long-run. Women's employment is highly sensitive to marital and parental status: While single young women's employment rates are relatively high particularly for those with post-secondary and university education, post-marriage and childbirth, women tend to withdraw from the labor market in large numbers to become full-time homemakers. A recent UN Women Survey (2018) finds that childcare and housework along with low wages are the top three reasons that women cite for remaining out of the labor market. Nevertheless

qualitative surveys show overall positive public attitudes towards women's labor market engagement, which constitutes an encouraging social basis for economic policy interventions.

The current policy framework to promote women's employment is narrowly focused on flexible employment as a primary strategy for work-life balance, which threatens to further promote gender jobs segregation and deepen the gender wage gap. Interventions on improving access to childcare services is limited to workplace based solutions rather than public investment in the care sector. It is essential to acknowledge that there is a need for a more comprehensive policy framework on women's employment whereby fiscal policies both on the spending and the revenue (taxation) side complement labor market measures.

An assessment of the gendered impact of the tax reform in Jordan provides some mixed findings. An important gain of the recent reform is that the new personal income tax law (effective from 2019 onwards) introduced an explicit acknowledgement of the female breadwinner status affirming women's right to benefit from tax exemptions for dependents, without the conditionality under the previous implementation of the law, of being a widow or (ex)husband unemployed. Single female breadwinner households are now subject to similar income tax rates as single male breadwinners, while under the previous implementation single female breadwinners could be subject to a higher tax rate. Individual filing remains an option for spouses, which prevents secondary earners (generally women) from being taxed at a higher marginal rate and hence

encourages women's employment and dual earner households. Nevertheless joint filing remains as an option for married couples (subject to the approval of both partners); and likely to be adopted by some given women's lower rates of financial literacy.

A gender-disaggregated analysis of the relative impact of increasing personal income tax was conducted on the basis of micro data on wage and salary earners from a Jordanian household labor market survey. Despite the data limitations, our findings on the change in the number of tax liable persons were in line with estimates reported by other sources. The main contribution of the analysis here is that it attempts to identify the change in the number of women versus men with increasing tax burdens. The lowering of tax exemption thresholds from JOD 12,000 to JOD 9,000 has brought about 4.1% of wage and salary earners with low earnings into tax liability; and for the rest of the already tax liable workers (3.7%), the rearranging of tax brackets and rates has increased their tax burden. As far as a gender breakdown is concerned, the absolute numbers as well as the relative shares of women wage and salary earners subject to increasing tax liabilities and rates is lower than that of men. Post-reform, an additional 2.8% of female wage and salary earners become tax liable, with 95.0% remaining under the threshold (versus 97.8% pre-reform); while an additional 4.4% of men wage and salary earners become tax liable, with 91.6% remaining under the threshold (versus 96.0% pre-reform). Including the upper income brackets, a total of approximately an additional 4% of female wage and salary earners and 6.1% of male wage and salary earners are now subject to a higher tax burden in the post-reform period.

These findings show that the income tax reform increased both the number of tax-liable women and men, but it did not necessarily increase women's tax burden more than men's. However, it is important to note that the lower number and share of women than men becoming tax liable under the new law, derives from two economic gender gaps to start with: The gender employment gap and the gender wage gap. Given very low female labor force participation rate, there are far fewer women wage and salary earners than men. The number of male wage and salary earners in our database (821,578 male workers) was more than four times than that of women wage and salary earners (208,050). Second, a higher share

of women wage and salary earners (95.0%) than men (91.6%) earn under JOD 9,000, which is the new tax exemption threshold. In other words, a relatively lower potential negative impact of the income tax reform on women wage and salary earners is due to structural gender inequalities in the labor market disfavoring women: Women face drastically more limited job opportunities than men and those who are in employment earn less than men.

The analysis also explored the impact of the income tax reform on vertical and horizontal equity across households of different income groups and compositions by gender and employment status. Close to half of all households (46.4%) in Jordan are traditional male breadwinner households, i.e. married couple households with a male breadwinner and a dependent (i.e. non-employed) wife. Dual-earner couples (wife and husband both employed) constitute only 7.2% of all households, reflective of the very low female employment rate. Single female and male breadwinners constitute a small minority (0.7% and 1% respectively). Close to one third (29.8%) of households fall into the 'no one employed' category.

Exploring the hypothetical income tax experienced by different types of households at different income levels, we found that all types of households at the mean level of income remained tax-exempt (under the threshold). At relatively higher income levels (above JOD 20,000), the tax liability of all types of households increased. Yet post-reform, the dual earner households benefit from a lower tax rate than the single male breadwinner households with the same level of income. The dual earner tax advantage over the single male breadwinner is higher, the lower the gender wage gap. Nevertheless, dual earner households stand at a tax disadvantage vis-à-vis multiple male breadwinner households (husband employed, wife dependent plus an additional earner such as the son/daughter). This is due to the imposition of a maximum ceiling of JOD 23,000 on collective exemptions of dual earner spouses, while other types of multiple taxpayer households are not subject to such a ceiling.

The recent income tax reform has facilitated a slight shift from indirect (sales) to direct (income) taxes as the source of public revenues. While this is a step in the right direction, Jordanian tax revenue collection continues to depend heavily on indirect taxes. Given

the regressive nature of indirect taxation, women who are concentrated at the bottom of the income ladder, tend to bear a larger burden. Our analysis of the gender impact of indirect sales taxes in Jordan, has confirmed that an increase in the general sales tax (GST) is likely to increase gender income gaps as women in Jordan allocate a higher share of their income towards consumption expenditures than men, and they also allocate a higher share of their expenditures to necessity items such as food, education and medical services than luxury expenditures when compared to men (a gender pattern observed elsewhere). Hence reductions (increases) of the sales tax particularly on necessity consumption goods and services are likely to (dis) advantage women with lower incomes as well as their children and families.

Beyond the tax reform, an important channel through which the gendered effects of the recent macroeconomic and fiscal policy reforms in Jordan prevail pertains to the constraints on fiscal spending. Due to women's structural roles as primary care givers in the family, cuts in public spending and consequent deterioration in quantity and quality of health, education and social services increase their unpaid work burden, impose more binding constraints on their time and hence acts as a deterrent to their equal access to employment and earnings. Under the austerity measures in Jordan, public expenditures have experienced a sharp decline (by almost 10 percentage points in the past decade), including public investment and social spending.

Due to the lack of time-use data in Jordan, it is not possible to explore the impact of austerity on women's unpaid work time. Nevertheless, labor market statistics disaggregated by gender, education and marital status points to unpaid care work as a primary factor conditioning women's labor market activity rates. Given the cost of paid market services as substitutes to unpaid work, women's reservation wages are set higher relative to men, facilitating their drastically lower labor force participation. Average childcare costs as a share of women's median wages range from 123% for primary school graduates to 77% for university graduates. The lack of access to affordable and quality childcare services when combined with low wages for women, acts as an important factor weakening women's labor market attachment. Hence there is a need for eliminating

the gender wage gap, improving real wages (possible only under robust jobs generating macroeconomic growth, see more in Section III) and reducing childcare costs through public subsidized quality childcare services.

Fiscal policy can serve as an important tool to remedy these imbalances: On the spending side, by allowing the room for public expenditures on the social care services sector; on the revenues side, for fine-tuning taxation to narrow the gender income gap and promoting dual earner households.

Policy Recommendations

- Allow additional exemptions in personal income tax for expenditures on child care (and other social care) services and domestic services;
- Remove the ceiling on tax exemption of spouses;
- Improve women's financial literacy about the advantages/disadvantages of individual versus joint filing of taxes by spouses (Department of Taxes can inform spouses who apply for joint filing);
- Ensure implementation of Article 9/E of the new tax law defining female breadwinner status so that women in multiple taxpayer households can obtain breadwinner certificate to benefit from tax exemptions (prevent gender discriminatory use of the personal status law as observed pre-tax reform, which would be in conflict with Article 9/E of the new tax law);
- Grant tax incentives to the social care services sector under Article 81 of the new law which foresees that tax incentives may be granted to specific sectors in accordance with the needs of the economic interest;
- Exempt or reduce the general sales tax on necessity goods and services taking account of gendered expenditure patterns;
- Undertake a gender disaggregated analysis of personal income taxation based on administrative data;
- Use gender budgeting at the national and local levels as a tool to evaluate and reallocate public spending in order to promote gender equality;
- Increase public investment and spending on quality social care services in view of its double potential for alleviating constraints on women's labor supply simultaneously with boosting labor demand (i.e. generating substantially higher number of new jobs –particularly for women- than other sectoral spending given the high labor intensity of the social care services sector as evidenced by recent empirical studies elsewhere);
- Prioritize decent jobs creation as a priority objective of macroeconomic policies; take account of the differential employment generation potential of fiscal spending allocations (as explained above);
- Use active labor market policies such as community works programs to support women's reentry into the labor market;
- Design labor market interventions to promote women's employment with a focus on women's economic empowerment and gender equality, and not simply 'increasing women's employment rate';
- As part of the above, undertake labor market reform for work-life balance for gender equality; i.e. for example, flexible work options should be promoted with a life-cycle approach not as permanent 'female' jobs but temporary work arrangements for both men and women workers with care responsibilities; as well as policies on care leave, care insurance, full-time work hours regulation (See: UN Women 2018 for a detailed discussion of policy options);
- Support Jordanian Department of Statistics to conduct Time-Use Surveys and also to enable researchers' access to gender disaggregated micro data from household surveys.

I. INTRODUCTION

The persistent and large gender gaps in access to gainful employment and income constitute an important structural challenge faced by the Jordanian economy. There is widespread acceptance by all economic policy-making bodies, including the Government of Jordan most importantly and intergovernmental advising agencies ranging from the IMF to the ILO that addressing the gender economic gaps (in particular the gender employment gap) is of crucial importance not only for the sake of gender equality but also for inclusive and dynamic growth.

The current macroeconomic context in Jordan is characterized by a substantial slowdown in growth and macroeconomic volatility. This together with the reality of an influx of refugees corresponding to as much as one-fifth of the population, carry the potential to further exacerbate the already deep gender economic gaps. The recent rise in the unemployment rate and the parallel decline in the (female) labor force participation rate is a testimony of this vulnerability. Given women's structural economic roles as secondary earners, they are particularly in need of a robust, decent jobs generating growth environment to facilitate their integration into the labor market.

There is a series of recent macroeconomic policy reforms to address the growth and employment creation challenges faced by the Jordanian economy. Given Jordan's pegged exchange rate system, there is little room for monetary policy interventions. As such the reform efforts hinge on a comprehensive fiscal consolidation effort operational through both a tax reform and expenditures restraint. Complementing the fiscal stabilization is a series of structural reforms towards labor market flexibilization and increasing efficiency of economic institutions. It is well established in the gender and economics literature that fiscal policy is a powerful instrument for facilitating redistributive outcomes not only by socioeconomic status but also by gender. Many country experiences demonstrate that austerity and labor market flexibilization entail implicit gender biases.

This report aims to present a critical evaluation of the recent macroeconomic and fiscal policy interventions in Jordan, in particular the tax reform, from a gender perspective. The report is structured as follows. Section II entails a review of the gendered patterns and gaps in the labor market in Jordan. Section III evaluates the current macroeconomic context and policy interventions with a focus on fiscal expenditures and structural reforms. Against this background, Section IV undertakes a critical assessment of the potential gender impact of the recent tax reform. Section V concludes with a summary of findings and policy implications.

II. ECONOMIC GENDER GAPS: AN OVERVIEW - GENDER INEQUALITIES IN THE LABOR MARKET¹

As of 2018, Jordan ranks 138th out of 149 countries in terms of its Global Gender Gap index.² Jordan's ranking has deteriorated from 93rd place in 2006. The index is made up of four major empowerment components in health, education, economy, and politics. Jordan's best performance is in education (45th improving from 70th in 2006) followed by health and survival (102nd with a substantial regression from 62nd in 2006); 129th in political empowerment (reduced from 100th in 2006) and ranking last is its economic empowerment index ranking 144th (deteriorating further from 105th in 2006). Each empowerment component is made up of sub-components. In economic empowerment, Jordan's worst performance is in labor force participation where it ranks as 147th (the 3rd country from the bottom). This is followed by estimated earned income (in purchasing power parity USD) where Jordan ranks 145th. Its best economic performance subindex is in 'wage for equal work', ranked at 84th place.

Trends in the female employment rate since the early 2000s shows hardly any improvement, from 9.3% in 2000 to only 11.3% in 2018 (Figure 1). The male employment rate is substantially higher but shows a decreasing trend from 56.6% in 2000 to 47.1% in 2018. Hence the combined national employment rate is very low only at 29.5%.

The male unemployment rate has experienced a sharp increase recently from an already high level, 10.4% in 2010 to 16.5% in 2018 (Figure 2). The female

unemployment rate, is substantially higher and on an increasing trend, from 21.7% in 2010 to 26.8% in 2018. Overall unemployment increased from 12.5% in 2010 to 18.6% in 2018. This sharp rise in the unemployment rate is largely an outcome of the recent external shocks experienced by the Jordanian economy as a result of the regional instability and the refugee crisis.

Combining the employed and the unemployed yields the total labor force; i.e. those who are either in employment or not in employment but actively seeking a job. Jordan has one of the lowest rate of female labor force participation globally as well as in the region at around 15.4% as of 2018. Only two other countries in the world (Yemen and Syria) have lower rates of female labor force participation than Jordan. The male labor force participation rate is also low by international standards (56.4% in 2018); but not to the same magnitude as female.³


The combination of the low and declining labor force participation along with high and increasing unemployment is a testimony to the employment creation challenge that Jordan is faced with. When the influx of refugees is considered as an additional stress factor on labor markets, the urgency of the need for jobs generating growth becomes obvious.

1 The labor market statistics in this section come from the Employment and Unemployment Survey (EUS) by the Jordanian Department of Statistics unless otherwise noted.

2 <http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-report-2018/data-explorer/#economy=JOR>


3 The comparator middle-income economies have male participation rates at 70% or higher (World Bank 2018).

FIGURE 1:
Employment rate by gender 2000-2018



Source: Compiled by the authors from DOS, EUS 2000-2018; Jordanians only.

FIGURE 2:
Unemployment rate by gender 2000-2018



Source: Compiled by the authors from DOS, EUS 2000-2018; Jordanians only.

The employment rate of prime working-age adults (25-54) peaks at 18.2% for women and a very high 71.2% for men. Employment rates for workers with post-secondary education are also higher than average; for women (men) with an intermediate diploma, the employment rate is 18.9% (57.1%) and for those with a university diploma, it peaks again at 38.6% for women (60.7% for men). There is a large gap in labor force participation rates of never-married women (21.1%) and married women (12.3%). The gap is reversed for men, with a participation rate of 61.5% for married men versus 50.1% for never-married men.


Combining all these demographic determinants of labor force participation, Figure 3 shows the employment rates of prime working age women and men disaggregated by education level and marital status. While the gender gaps for each group are striking, the gaps between never married and married women are also noteworthy. At each level of education, never married women’s employment rate is higher than their married counterparts. While 17% of prime working age never married women with secondary education are employed, with marriage this drops to 5.7%. Never married women with post-secondary and university education achieve very high employment rates at almost 50%, with marriage their employment rate is reduced to 14.2% and 31.8%. Single women and men with university education achieve

almost employment parity, but the gap increases to 46 percentage points with marriage.

This shows that there is as much a problem of women’s weak labor force attachment as much as barriers to entry. In other words, one in every two women with post-secondary education are able to find a job prior to marriage, at similar rates to men with identical educational qualifications. Hence as long as single, they seem to experience similar entry opportunities as men. Yet women drop out of the labor market post marriage, while men enter in greater numbers. This seems to reflect the strong presence of the gender division of labor and the restraints imposed by the unpaid work burden on married women, particularly in a context where childcare and social care services are not readily available or affordable vis-à-vis women’s wage earnings (see below Table 3 below for further data and discussion on this).

A survey (UN Women, 2018) finds that childcare and housework along with low wages are found to be amongst the top three reasons that women cite for not engaging in paid work. At the same time, data analysis shows that given the poor job generation and high unemployment, violation of the minimum wage laws is becoming increasingly abundant. This is even the case for generally formal sector jobs such as teachers.

FIGURE 3:
Employment Rate of Prime Working Age (25-54) Population by Gender, Education and Marital Status



Source: JLMPs, 2016, For Jordanian citizens only 15 and older

Of the labor market inactive women (neither employed nor unemployed, i.e. actively seeking a job), 78.6% cite full-time homemaking as the reason for non-participation (versus 4.5% of men). For men, the primary reasons for non-participation are being a student (40.9% vs. 18.7% for women), having income other than labor earnings, such as pension or property income (34.3% vs. 0.8% for women), or poor health/disability (15.1% vs. 1.9% for women).

An overwhelming majority of employment is in the status of wage and salary earners: 96% of women and 87% of men. The public sector is an important source of employment for women (49.5% versus 38% for men). Own account workers make up a small share unusual for a developing economy, as little as 2.3% for women and 10.1% for men. 76% of women's employment and 53.3% of men's employment is in the formal sector (JLMPS 2016).

The raw gender wage gap is relatively small where the annual median wage earnings of women stand at 90% of the annual median wage earnings of men (Table 1). This is partly due to the fact that the few women who are in employment have higher education and represent a select minority with strong labor market attributes. When disaggregated by education level, the wage gap becomes larger. It is the highest for those with lower education: women with less than primary education earn on average 63% of men's wages; for workers with primary education the gap stands at 71%; with secondary education at 79%, with an intermediate diploma at 84%, and is the lowest at 88% for workers with university and higher education.

TABLE 1:
Annual Wage Income by Gender and Education Level

Wage Income	Total	Women	Men	Gender Wage Gap (W Wage/M Wage)
TOTAL				
No of Workers	1,029,628	208,050	821,578	
Minimum	72	360	72	
Mean	5,149 [*]	4,686	5,266	0.89
Median	4,440	4,200	4,668	0.90
Maximum	229,800	195,160	229,800	
Less Than Primary Education				
No of Workers	111,749	7,381	104,368	
Minimum	72	364	72	
Mean	4,057	2,780	4,147	0.67
Median	3,600	2,400	3,780	0.63
Maximum	87,000	5,760	87,000	
Primary Education				
No of Workers	318,742	19,859	298,883	
Minimum	350	1,200	350	
Mean	4,742	6,133	4,649	1.32
Median	4,200	3,000	4,200	0.71
Maximum	95,160	95,160	49,200	
Secondary Education				
No of Workers	178,348	21,276	157,072	
Minimum	250	900	250	
Mean	5,038	4,124	5,162	0.80
Median	4,320	3,600	4,560	0.79
Maximum	70,200	21,600	70,200	
High School Education				
No of Workers	112,914	39,270	73,644	
Minimum	240	420	240	
Mean	4,951	3,939	5,491	0.72
Median	4,200	4,020	4,800	0.84
Maximum	78,000	8,640	78,000	
University and Higher Education				
No of Workers	307,875	120,264	187,611	
Minimum	120	360	120	
Mean	6,104	4,097	6,870	0.60
Median	5,040	4,800	5,040	0.88
Maximum	229,800	48,000	229,800	

**DOS; HEIS 2017, Table 3.4. Average Household income from Employment is 4.625.*

See: <http://dosweb.dos.gov.jo/economic/expenditures-income/>

Source: Authors' Calculations based on JLMPS 2016, Regular Wage Earners, Jordanians only.

Two special modules of JLMPS 2016 on women's attitudes towards and experiences of employment and access to income provide some important insights (See Appendix II for detailed results of these modules). Reflecting the very low levels of labor market engagement, women's access to income as well as property ownership is extremely limited. As much as 81% of Jordanian women aged 15-59 state that they do not have any ready access to household money for use; 94% do not own any property or have any savings.

The economic disempowerment is reflected also on limitations on women's mobility outside the household. In response to a series of questions on whether they can go to various places such as the local market, a doctor's practice or to visit family or friends, almost half the respondents state they cannot go alone; about a third state they can go alone only after getting permission of husband or their parents. The results are similar for married and never married

women. Divorced or widowed women generally enjoy higher freedom of mobility. These restrictions on women's mobility in public space are likely to impose further constraints on their labor market entry.

Women's as well as men's attitudes toward women engaging in paid work are overwhelmingly positive (Table 2). Three-quarters of women agree with the statement that women should be allowed to work for pay; more than 80% think a husband should help a working wife with childcare and household chores. Those who think that a woman who works outside the home cannot be a good mother (17%) or cannot sustain a good relationship with her husband (24%) are in the minority. Two-thirds believe working and having earnings is crucial for a woman's autonomy. The majority are in support of women in leadership (83%), boys and girls receiving equal schooling (92%) and being treated equally (93%), and girls going to school to prepare for jobs (71%).

TABLE 2:
Women's and Men's Attitudes Towards Paid Employment

	Women			Men		
	Agree or strongly agree	Disagree or strongly disagree	Neutral	Agree or strongly agree	Disagree or strongly disagree	Neutral
A woman's place is not only in the household, but she should also be allowed to work.	86.2	3.7	10.1	75.2	13.3	11.7
The husband should help his working wife raise their children	81.0	9.0	9.1	70.1	17.5	12.4
The husband should help his working wife with household chores	57.7	7.1	9.5	68.4	17.8	13.8
Girls should go to school to prepare for jobs, not just to make them good mothers and housewives	70.5	15.4	14.1	61.3	20.7	18.0
A woman who works outside the home cannot be a good mother	16.9	68.7	14.4	22.5	57.9	19.6
For a woman's financial autonomy, she must work and have earnings	78.7	6.4	15.2	64.9	14.6	20.5
A woman's work interferes with her ability to keep a good relationship with her husband.	23.9	61.7	14.4	28.9	51.7	19.4
Women should continue to obtain leadership positions in society	83.2	4.2	12.7	68.2	14.2	17.6
Boys and girls should get the same amount of schooling.	92.0	0.9	7.10	88.4	2.8	8.8
Boys and girls should be treated equally.	93.0	0.5	6.5	90.4	1.4	8.2

Source: Authors' Calculations based on JLMPS 2016, for Jordanians aged 15 and over (total sample representing 2,205,845 women and 2,160,954 men).

Men also seem to display similarly positive attitudes even though relatively less than women. 75% of men agree that women should be allowed to work; the majority of men believe that husband should help a working wife with childcare and household chores (around 80% and 68%, respectively). Men mainly support the idea of preparing girls for jobs (61%). Half of the men think that a woman who works outside the home can sustain a good relationship with her husband. The majority of men believe that working and having earnings is crucial for a woman's autonomy (65%). Those who believe a woman who works outside the home cannot be a good mother (23%) are in the minority. Besides, men have stronger thoughts about supporting women and girl's position in the society, and they believe to support women in leadership, boys and girls receiving equal schooling and being treated equality (69%, 88%, and 90%, respectively). These attitudes show a similar pattern for different household types. Generally, men from dual-earner households have much stronger positive attitudes; but also the majority of men from male breadwinner households have positive thoughts, as well. (See Appendix II)

A series of questions directed at directed at married women with employment record (at the time of the survey or in the past) inquires about attitudes and Experiences. Questioned about their husbands' opinions, an overwhelming 90% state that their husbands are strongly supportive (48.6%) or supportive (41.5%) of their engagement in paid work. Of single women about two-thirds believed that having a paid job enhances their 'marriageability'; 37% thought it had no influence, only 1.3% thought it would be preventive. 69% said they would definitely continue working after marriage, only 13.4% said no. The rest replied it would depend on husband (10.4%) or circumstances (5.7%).

Yet when women are questioned about the reason for leaving their job, about one fifth cite refusal of husband/father or some other family member as the primary reason. An equal share state that they did not want to continue working at a job; 13% stated family care; 22% gave lack of suitable jobs or poor work conditions such as low wages.

Married women with employment record are also questioned about experiences with respect to reconciling work and family responsibilities.

Accordingly, of the women who were in employment during pregnancy, 15% were not able to use maternity leave; 28.5% took only 2-6 weeks of maternity leave, and slightly less than half (45.5%) were able to benefit from the statutory 7-13 weeks of maternity leave. As for nursing leave, half of the women were not able to take any leave at all, 21.3% got less than 3 months and 24.5% got 3 months of nursing leave. Of the employed women with small children (under age 12), more than half (60%) said they depend on unpaid work of family members or friends (mother, mother-in-law, sister, husband, neighbors). Only 22.5% use a nursery, 2% use paid domestic help, and 13.4% had children in primary school.

Summing up the employed mothers who use daycare or paid domestic help, the total use of paid help or services for childcare, corresponds to about a quarter (24.5%) of employed mothers with children. The mean of their monthly payments for childcare was JOD 307 in 2016 prices. Comparing this cost to the median monthly wage earnings yields some striking observations. According to JLMPS 2016, the median monthly wage for women is around JOD 350 in 2016 prices.⁴ Hence an employed mother with only one small child would have to spend 87.7% of her earnings on childcare (Table 3).

The disaggregation of median female wage incomes by education level shows the gross inequalities amongst women in terms of the affordability of paid childcare and hence their options for labor market attachment (Table 3). For women with lower than primary education, the median monthly wage earnings is around JOD 200, corresponding to a ratio of 154% for childcare costs to wages. The ratio of childcare costs to women's monthly median wage earnings improves slightly with education level, to 123% for employed women with primary education, 102% for women with secondary education, 92% for women with an intermediate diploma, and 77% for women with university or higher education. For all education levels, except those with university and higher education the women can barely afford childcare payments on the basis of own earnings. It is striking that even for women with higher education, wage earnings are barely sufficient to cover the payment for childcare. It should be noted that with more children the childcare services are costlier. This

4 The monthly wage is based on reported regular wage earners (JLMPS 2016) (see Table 1).

comparison provides us with further insights into the employment patterns disaggregated by gender, education level and marital status as presented in Figure 3 above.

The discussion points to a crucial area for policy intervention: Given the cost of paid childcare services, women’s reservation wages are set higher relative to

men, which facilitates their drastically lower labor force participation. Hence either real wages would need to improve (possible only under robust jobs generating macroeconomic growth, see more in Section III) and/or childcare costs would need to be lowered through public subsidized childcare services. A most effective strategy would be a simultaneous intervention on both ends.

TABLE 3:
Comparison of Average Childcare Costs to Women’s Average Wages

	Mean Monthly Cost of Childcare (JOD)	Median Monthly Wage for Women (JOD)	The Ratio of Cost to Wage 1 child (%)
Total	307	350	87.7
Lower than primary schooling	307	200	153.5
Primary schooling	307	250	122.8
Secondary schooling	307	300	102.3
Intermediate diploma	307	335	91.6
University or higher	307	400	76.8

Source: Authors’ calculation based on JLMPS 2016.

Early childhood care and education (ECCE) enrolment rate in Jordan is under 30%, which is very low by international standards. The inequalities amongst employed mothers in access to ECCE services are reflected also in equalities in access amongst children. The predicted probability of enrolling in an ECCE center for a “most disadvantaged” child from a rural household in the bottom income quintile located in South Jordan is only 5% versus a predicted of 44% for a “most advantaged” child from an urban household in the top income quintile located in central Jordan.⁵ Hence access to quality ECCE services is as much a matter of gender inequalities as a matter of socioeconomic inequalities amongst children and from a longer run perspective a matter of human capital development. The economic policymakers at the highest level in Jordan demonstrate their awareness of the multiple implications of access to quality daycare, by pointing out that it is also recognized within the current National Strategy for Human Resource Development (NSHRD) as a critical component of early development and education. Hence they acknowledge that ECCE contributes *“not only to female participation and inclusion in the workforce over the short run, but also helping ensure that Jordan’s economy has a workforce with the skills, qualifications, and capabilities needed to secure its prosperity over the long run.”*⁶

It should be noted, however, provisioning of services constitutes a necessary but not sufficient solution to the gender gaps in employment. Even for women for whom quality childcare services are affordable, the reconciliation of work and family continues to be an issue outside of service hours. Hence women still continue to juggle a second unpaid domestic work shift in addition to paid work. This results in lower work hours, weaker jobs commitment, and choice of jobs with more defined and shorter work hours and workload such as public employment.

5 See: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/jordan/publication/ecd2015>

6 Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, Attachment to the Letter of Intent to IMF signed by the Minister of Finance and Governor of Central Bank, dated April 18, 2019.

III. THE MACROECONOMIC CONTEXT AND FISCAL POLICY IN JORDAN FROM A GENDER PERSPECTIVE

Gender and economics research has long shown that macroeconomic policy and in particular fiscal policy entails strong distributional outcomes not only by socioeconomic class but also by gender. Failing to acknowledge gender issues in macroeconomic policies can lead to unintended consequences deepening gender inequalities, and through adverse impact on certain groups of disadvantaged women, also deepening inequalities amongst households and children by socioeconomic status. Moreover, an economic context characterized by gender inequalities in access to labor markets and income generating opportunities may have the consequence that macroeconomic policy is not effective and does not fulfill its intended objectives in an effective manner.

Fiscal policy can serve as a powerful instrument for supporting income redistribution in favor of disadvantaged groups including women and promoting inclusive growth. This effect comes through the two primary tools of fiscal policy: Taxation and public spending. Taxation enables the raising of revenues as the primary source of public spending on the provisioning of public services as well as subsidies and social transfers, all of which benefit the disadvantaged households relatively more. Therefore, higher revenues raised through an effective, revenue maximizing tax system, enable higher public spending. To the extent that the spending is targeted appropriately and effective, higher tax revenues then promote equality of opportunity and outcomes.

This section presents a critical review of the recent fiscal policy framework in Jordan from a gender perspective within the context of overall macroeconomic policy measures towards fiscal consolidation and macroeconomic stabilization. Here the emphasis is on the spending side, while the

following section addresses the taxation and revenue side of fiscal policy and presents a gender analysis of the recent tax reform in Jordan.

III.A. Conceptual Framework: Fiscal Spending and Gender Equality

Taxation and public expenditures are two tools of fiscal policy with gender distributive outcomes. Public expenditures can potentially facilitate stronger effects from a gender perspective than interventions on the revenue side (i.e. taxation policy). The gendered effects of fiscal spending become operational through two channels:

1. The amount of spending, as well as the type of spending (how much is spent, and where it is spent), determines the quantity, quality, and types of public services available, such as health, education, social care, transportation services. This facilitates gendered impact primarily due to three underlying factors:
 - a. Given women's structurally disproportionate burden of unpaid work, access to (or lack thereof) quality and affordable social care services reduce (enhance) their unpaid workload; facilitating narrowing (further deepening) of gender gaps in the economic sphere, namely the gender employment gap, gender jobs segregation and the gender wage gap.
 - b. Given biological differences, access to (or lack thereof) quality reproductive and maternal health services carry important implications for women's health and wellbeing; and as fertility and health are important determinants of labor force participation, they have effects for gender economic gaps as well.

- c. The amount and type of fiscal spending also have implications for the level and type of public employment, where women typically have a larger share since the regulated and formal public jobs provide a better environment for work-life balance).
2. The amount, as well as the type of spending, also determines the prospects for robust decent jobs generating growth. While this is important for all -women and men alike-, it carries stronger implications for women due to two factors:
- a. Jobs generation alleviates not only unemployment for women (as it does for men) but also provides an impetus for their labor market activation from their structural position of secondary earners;
 - b. As decent jobs generation reduces unemployment, labor market conditions also improve, including wages, formal employment, work hours, and worker rights. Given women's structurally higher reservation wages (as discussed in Section III for Jordanian women), improvement of labor market conditions provides again additional impetus for women's labor market activation.

These gendered outcomes of fiscal policy have become an increasing concern in the post-oil crisis era (from the late 1970s onwards) as the macroeconomic policy paradigm shifted from a Keynesian framework focused on demand to a mainstream (neoclassical) framework focused on supply. The former perceives growth primarily as an outcome of (consumer) demand for goods and services. In recessionary periods, it calls for active government intervention through policies such as fiscal spending to boost effective demand. The latter perceives growth primarily as an outcome of favorable conditions for the producers for supply (production) of goods and services. It argues such favorable conditions are created best through free markets, i.e. with minimum government intervention in the economy. In recessionary periods, it calls for measures such as austerity policies aimed at wage restraint and inflation control, which are expected to restore profitability conditions for the producers over time and instigate a supply-led growth.

Austerity policies entail a negative gendered impact primarily through the reduction of public spending that often results in deterioration of the quantity and quality of public services in areas such as health,

education, and other social care services. The more limited is the access to social care services (childcare centers, elderly, disabled and ill care services) and the lower the quality of available services, the higher the requirements on women's unpaid work time. Many empirical studies now clearly document that women bear the cost of austerity with an increasing unpaid workload, deepened gender gaps in time-use patterns and increasing gender gaps in the labor market.⁷

Beyond cutbacks in public spending, an austerity policy stance foresees a series of measures aimed at overall domestic demand constraint, focused exclusively on macroeconomic stabilization (inflation control and deficit reduction). Such domestic demand constraint comes usually at the cost of higher unemployment and weaker jobs generation, at least in the short-run. An important tool of austerity freezes on public employment, public wages and the minimum wage, with spillover effects onto private sector wages. Devaluing of local currency is meant to constrain import demand. The expectation of an austerity policy stance is that while the economy may suffer from higher unemployment and reduced purchasing power in the short run, over the long run the markets will recover as global competitiveness and domestic profitability is restored through lower domestic (labor) prices. Simultaneously deficits in public budgets and international trade as well as inflationary pressures will be eliminated.

Austerity measures, to the extent that they result in worsening labor market conditions, also carry a disproportionately adverse impact on women. Given their structural economic positioning as secondary income earners, a general lack of jobs, create more of a dampening effect on women's labor market entry decisions. Lower pay, longer full-time work hours, restricted access to care leave and job security, facilitate higher gender gaps in employment and wages, as well as further vertical and horizontal gender segregation of jobs through increased demands on women's unpaid work time.

Structural reforms towards labor market flexibilization constitute an important component of the mainstream macroeconomic policy recipe. These structural reforms are meant to complement austerity measures by facilitating a decrease in real wages in response to higher unemployment. Such

⁷ See for example, Benería et al. 2016; Bargawi et al. 2017.

flexibilization – especially part-time and home-based work - is argued to also support better employment opportunities for women. From a critical perspective, however, labor market flexibilization is likely to further weaken women’s labor market attachment. First, deregulated labor markets to the extent that they facilitate lower wages, restricted access to care leave and job security, imply less ability to afford paid care services and balance work and family life. Second, promoting the balancing of work-family life merely through part-time jobs and home-based work for women, promotes horizontal and vertical gender segregation of jobs as well as a gender pay gap. In other words, while flexibilization may narrow the gender employment gap, it does so at the expense of widening other gender gaps in the labor market. Third, as much of the recent research has shown, the gender gaps in employment, pay and access to job mobility, are likely to impede market competition and productivity, weaken growth and erode the efficiency of macroeconomic stabilization efforts.

The alternative non-mainstream approach to macroeconomic policy points out that increasing inequalities in income and wealth contribute to economic crises and pose structural constraints to growth in the long run. A gendered approach to macroeconomics unveils parallel causalities between gender inequalities and growth. Research shows that closing the gender gaps in employment and wages have a substantial positive impact on boosting economic growth. It is estimated that more than a quarter (27%) of GDP per capita is lost in some regions due to gender gaps in the labor market (Cuberes and Teignier, 2012). Country specific estimations suggest that closing the gender employment gap such whereby women’s rates rise to men’s levels, would, for instance, increase GDP in in Egypt by 34%, in the United Arab Emirates by 12%, in Japan by 9 percent and the United States by 5% (Aguirre, et.al. 2012).

Gender income inequalities also affect the composition of consumption since women tend to spend a higher share of their income on health, nutrition and education of children. Closing the gender gaps in income has the potential to improve the wellbeing of children and enhance human capital and productivity, and enhance growth. It also enables a dual-earner family structure, which reduces households’ vulnerability to economic shocks and their risk of poverty and improves the sustainability of

social protection systems (Ilkkaracan and Degirmenci 2013).

A series of recent policy simulations in different countries demonstrate that fiscal spending social care service expansion can be a very effective tool for closing the gender gaps and instigating simultaneous positive economic outcomes such as reduction of unemployment, alleviation of poverty and boosting of inclusive growth (Antonopoulos and Kim 2011). For instance, a policy simulation study on Turkey shows that if the Turkish government invested equivalent of 1.8% of GDP in the child care services sector instead of the construction sector (which has absorbed substantial public resources in recent years in Turkey), it could create 720,000 new jobs instead of 250,000; 85 percent of the jobs would go to women versus only 6 percent of the jobs in the case of construction; the poverty rate would be reduced by 1.5 percentage points instead of half a percentage point (Ilkkaracan, Kim and Kaya 2015).⁸

III.B. Macroeconomic Context and Fiscal Policy in Jordan

The Jordanian economy has been on a long-run trend of slow growth that began in 2010. Economic growth averaged just 2.1% per annum over 2011-2017 (down from an average of 6.1 percent per annum in 2000-2009). The slowdown in growth was triggered by the adverse external shocks of the global recession as well as the Syrian crisis. From 2011 onwards, there was an influx of close to 1.3 million Syrians increasing the population by as much as 20%.

Even prior to these external economic shocks, the Jordanian economy had pre-existing structural problems of high unemployment plus low labor force participation in the context of a low productivity economy, particularly very low female labor force participation as discussed in Section II. The external dual shock and the slow growth trend have further deepened and exacerbated the urgency of these pre-existing structural economic problems. The unemployment rate peaked at 18.6% in 2018 from an already high 12.5% in 2010; while the labor force participation rate plummeted to 36.2% from an

⁸ These examples can be expanded to include further research on other countries. For example, analysis from the U.K. shows that if the British government diverted investment worth 2% of GDP from construction to the care sector, it could create 1.5 million jobs instead of 750,000.

already low level of 39.5% in 2010. The Jordanian economy currently generates only around 50,000 new jobs a year, at a time when around 200,000 new jobs are needed just to absorb new entrants into the labor market every year (World Bank 2018).

In the meantime, Jordan's public debt, which stood at 60% of GDP in 2008, reached 96% of GDP in 2017. This was the result of two simultaneous forces. On the revenue side, tax collection remained rather stagnant over the past few decades, with hardly any improvement. The slowdown in growth had a further negative impact on raising of tax revenues. On the expenditures side, the demand has been enormous and increasing for funding social welfare measures under conditions of high and climbing unemployment, the pressure to maintain political stability in the aftermath of the so-called Arab spring in the region and finally the post-2011 influx of refugees.

As a response to this macroeconomic instability, Jordan has started implementing a national economic and fiscal reform program in coordination with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) through a stand-by agreement, aimed at restoring fiscal, monetary, and macroeconomic stability.⁹ Jordan has a pegged exchange rate system hence its monetary policy is not independent. As such fiscal policy remains as the main macroeconomic policy tool in Jordan. An assessment by the World Bank (2018) acknowledges that the most important element of the macroeconomic stabilization program is *"a tremendous fiscal adjustment, cumulatively amounting to close to US\$5 billion, or around 12 percent of average GDP from 2012 to 2018."*

The fiscal consolidation initiative has been led mostly by increases in direct (income) and indirect (sales) taxes so as to increase government revenues and reduce public debt (see the following section for a detailed discussion). In addition, the government secured a credit line from the International Monetary Fund. World Bank (2018) evaluates that while the rate of increase of the debt has slowed significantly owing to several years of fiscal consolidation efforts, debt sustainability levels will require significant additional fiscal measures: *"Policymakers have thus*

set themselves an ambitious challenge: targeting a higher potential GDP in the context of a worsened external environment and fiscal consolidation." In this context, the government submitted a draft tax law to parliament in May 2018 proposing increases in income tax while also announcing routine increases in the prices of gasoline. This has resulted in popular street demonstrations, which led to the resignation of Prime Minister in June (Karak Castle 2018). This was followed by several revisions of the tax reform proposal until its final adoption by the Jordanian Parliament in December 2018.

Under the austerity measures, public expenditures are on a sharp decline by almost 10 percentage points in the past decade (from an average of 37.2% of GDP in 1996-2005 to 29.9% in 2016-2017) (JSF 2018). Public investment declined from an average of 7.4% of GDP in 2000-2009 to 4.4% of GDP in 2010-2015, and further to 3.7% of GDP in both 2016 and 2017 (World Bank 2018). Social spending has declined to an average of 5.6% of GDP 2016-2018, compared to an average of 7.6% of GDP during the period 2010-2015, mainly due to removal and cuts on major subsidies on goods and services. Public spending on education and health averaged at around 3.3% and 3.8% of GDP respectively during the period 2010-2018 (JNCW 2019). Jordan's education system consists of kindergarten, basic schooling, and secondary schooling. Basic schooling (primary and middle school) and secondary schooling are free; education is compulsory for all children until the age of (16), it is estimated that 68% of all students go to public schools for all schooling levels. Of the total public education spending, expenditures on ECCE constitute less than 2%.¹⁰ In regard to health services, Jordan stands out as having one of the most modern health care infrastructures in the Middle East. Health care is highly subsidized through public primary health care centers and hospitals as well as investments in research and development. Jordan's public health insurance program covers about (89%) of the population, mostly civil servants and the very poor. Recently new measures have been adopted to ensure targeting of subsidized services to low-income groups - including a more systematic verification of applicants' income and insurance, and increased use of public hospitals - . Similar measures are under discussion to improve the targeting of social safety net programs, focusing on the poor and most vulnerable (JNCW 2019).

9 Jordan has first entered a stabilization and structural adjustment program under an IMF agreement in 1989 under similarly pressing financing needs under conditions of severe macroeconomic volatility and accumulated high public debt. The program entailed public expenditure reforms and supported macro-fiscal stabilization (Sarangi et al. 2015).

10 Reported as 1.2% of the total public budget on education in 2011 (USAID 2011).

Hence broadly speaking, the current economic macroeconomic stabilization and restructuring program in Jordan is very much in line with the mainstream macroeconomic policy prescription described above. The program sets ambitious targets for the reduction of the public budget deficit in a relatively short time span. It does anticipate the potential negative effects of the fiscal consolidation (i.e. unemployment rising further plus higher consumer prices due to tax increases and removals of energy subsidies; provoking increased risk of poverty and social unrest). The mainstream framework suggests that the problems will be resolved over time as macroeconomic balances are restored and growth is instigated. Economic restructuring on the supply side to improve the business environment will compliment stabilization efforts to restore growth: namely, labor market flexibilization and easing firm access to credit. Eventually, this will facilitate a reduction in the unemployment rate.

Given that the macroeconomic stabilization program hinges on comprehensive fiscal consolidation efforts, its short-run growth and redistributive outcomes are of much importance. There are two recent studies exploring the distributive impact of taxation and social expenditures in Jordan in the pre-reform period. A study by ESCWA examines the effectiveness of fiscal expenditures in Jordan in the period 1991-2013 by two measures: its ability to boost economic growth as well as its income redistributive impact on poverty and equality (Sarangi, et.al. 2015). On the first measure, the study finds that public expenditures have a high multiplier impact (a multiplier of 2.5 for current expenditures; and a peak multiplier of 5.8 for capital investment expenditure achieved in a span of 3 years). Within current expenditures, subsidies, social benefits and compensation of public employees, all have positive multipliers. On the second income distributive measure, the study confirms the expectation that the incidence of direct taxation is mildly regressive (with a small negative impact on income inequality), indirect taxation is regressive while transfers are highly progressive (improving income equality). Hence the overall macroeconomic stabilization program is likely to depress growth further in the short-run as well as have a disproportionately negative impact on the more vulnerable groups.

A World Bank study uses household data for 2010-2011 to explore the impact of taxation and social transfers (including households' use of education

and health services) on poverty and household income inequality (Alam, et.al. 2017). Similar to the ESCWA study, this study also concludes that Jordan's fiscal system is mostly progressive, on the basis that it decreases the poverty headcount and inequality in the country. More specifically, the study finds that direct taxes (personal income taxes), direct cash transfer programs, and in-kind education benefits are very progressive. In contrast, indirect taxes appear to be regressive, as they seemingly increase income inequality. The study concludes that the poor and the middle class could potentially benefit from changes in the general sales tax (GST) system because they currently spend a greater fraction of their incomes on indirect taxes than do the wealthier households.

Aware of such distributive implications of fiscal policy, the fiscal consolidation and macroeconomic stabilization program are supported by a new five-year Jordan Economic Growth Plan as well as a number of social safety net measures which are claimed to counteract any negative impact and produce overall positive outcomes. The growth plan targets doubling of economic growth over 2018–22 and reducing the debt burden, through structural reforms aimed at *“improving the business climate, boosting exports, creating jobs and sustainably lifting incomes”* (World Bank 2018).

The structural reforms are supported through a finance fund by the World Bank, entitled the Equitable Growth and Job Creation Development Policy Loan (DPL), explicitly acknowledging ‘equitable’ growth and ‘job creation’ as the focus of restructuring efforts.¹¹ The DPL loan includes a concessional portion to support *“simplification of the business environment and the development of exports, the development of credit infrastructure, the introduction of flexibility into the labor market, the reduction of cross-subsidies in electricity pricing and the development and further expansion of the social assistance system”* (World Bank 2018). As elsewhere, also in the case of Jordan, it is claimed that labor market flexibilization will particularly be effective in raising women's labor force participation rates. This is further discussed below under the gender assessment of fiscal policy changes.

11 DPL1 in 2018 was in the amount of USD 500 million; DPL2 approved as of June 2019 is USD 1.45 billion (see: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2019/06/04/us145-billion-to-promote-inclusive-growth-and-job-creation-in-jordan>).

In addition, targeted social transfers are to accompany the tax reforms, so that vulnerable segments of the population do not face an increase in their tax burden (discussed more in Section IV). The program also includes a minimum level of social spending targeted at illness and disability, old age, family and children, housing, and research and development in the field of social protection. It has also accommodated the expansion of the National Aid Fund's cash-transfer program as well as the increased coverage of the civil health insurance (IMF 2019). The possible gender redistributive impact is not acknowledged not in an explicit manner. Nevertheless, nearly all policy documents on the overall macroeconomic and fiscal policy reform in Jordan acknowledge increasing women's employment rate as an important policy objective. The following sub-section proceeds with an assessment of how gender issues are addressed in these policy initiatives.

III.C. An Assessment of Policy Interventions on Women's Employment

Improving women's employment rate is a widely acknowledged policy objective of the recent macroeconomic policy reforms by the Government as well as its international partners. The London Initiative, which took place in February 2019 in London with the aim of promoting dialogue between the Jordanian Government and its international de facto and potential lenders on economic policy commitments, establishes "increasing the opportunities for and unlocking the potential for women and young people" as one of its five key deliverables of its foremost objective of promoting growth (London Initiative 2019 Concept Note).

The most recent IMF review of the Jordanian economic program sets job creation particularly for women and the youth as a foremost policy target on equal standing with reduction of public debt (IMF 2019):

"Now, with the completion of the second review, Jordan should direct all efforts on implementing the reforms recently enacted and sustain policies that will help reduce public debt, create jobs, especially for the youth and women, and achieve inclusive growth."

The reforms that are specifically designed to support female labor force participation are envisaged in four categories:¹²

- the recently approved by-law on flexible working hours;
- facilitation of access to child-care services;
- provision of low-cost and efficient public transportation system;
- options to lower the costs for formal jobs for women.

The World Bank restructuring program also emphasizes women's employment as one of the primary policy objectives. Promotion and regulation of flexible work and facilitating access to childcare centers are the priority strategies here as well. In addition, the World Bank restructuring program commends legal reforms by the Government at the elimination of gender-related references from labor laws and bylaws; as well as the adoption of codes of conduct that address harassment in the public transport system and workplace.

Based on a recent review of Jordan's National Employment Strategy, one of the three main ILO recommendations includes "unlocking the potential of women in the labor market." Once again the main strategy is through the introduction of more flexible work arrangements. Another policy measure suggested by the ILO is strengthening the enforcement of maternity benefits.

Along these lines, as the Jordanian Government presents a comprehensive review of its policy reform efforts in its letter of intent to the IMF dated 18 April 2019, reforms to promote women's employment is one of the major areas covered. Legal reforms for flexible work, improving access to childcare and care leave, removal of gender discriminatory articles in labor law are the reforms efforts on which the Government reports. This sub-section undertakes a review of these various policy strategies for improving women's employment from a gender equality perspective. As was mentioned above, an important pillar of the restructuring finance fund by the World Bank (DPL)

¹² See IMF Jordan web page: <https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/JOR/FAQ#Q5>

is labor market flexibilization. The DPL suggests that this will help with supporting women's labor force participation through options of part-time and temporary jobs through the following categories (World Bank 2018):

1. *Part-time: if the type of works allows, the employee can work for fewer hours;*
2. *Flexible working hours: working within flexible hours daily given that the number of working hours will not be less than the minimum hours per day;*
3. *Intensive work weeks: distributing the working hours in the work days in a way that it will not exceed 10 hours per day;*
4. *Flexible year: working on the agreed number of months per year that shouldn't exceed the law provisions; and*
5. *Telecommuting (working from distance).*

The focus on labor market flexibilization as the primary strategy for improving women's employment rate requires a careful assessment from an equality perspective. First of all, flexible work options 1, 4 and 5 are different from options 2 and 3. The former (i.e. part-time and home-based work) is likely to be accommodated only by specific types of jobs, with limited upward mobility, hence with lower pay. Hence while they may help to facilitate a relative increase in women's employment, the narrowing down of the gender employment gap would be realized at the cost of further widening of the gender jobs segregation (both horizontal and vertical segregation) and the gender pay gap.

Second, what lies behind the assumed connection between flexible jobs and women's employment, is the fact that women bear a disproportionate amount of the unpaid care burden. Hence it is assumed that women will be able to reconcile paid and unpaid work through flexible forms of employment. Such an approach remains short of challenging the gender division of labor, which is a fundamental source of gender economic gaps.

Any efforts at flexibilization of jobs should focus not only on women but also on men, simultaneously improving women's uptake of paid work along with men's uptake of unpaid work. This enables a new

definition of flexible work for gender equality: Jobs that are temporarily (not permanently) flexible over the life course to improve work-life balance both for women and men. This means flexibility of work conditions temporarily so as to address employee needs in times of increased care responsibility such as the birth of a child or falling ill of a family member. Hence the ultimate objective of flexibilization efforts needs to be preserving full-time jobs (and associated pay and social security rights) while ensuring a better work-life balance through employees' control over the allocation of work hours/days and partial work-from-home as well as their entitlement to legal rights to care leave.¹³

The Bylaw on Flexible Work approved by the Council of Ministers in early 2019, in fact entails only the inequality enhancing flexible work measures for part-time work (no.1 and 4 above) and home-based work (no.5 above). The new law redefines the minimum wage on an hourly basis rather than a monthly basis. The next phase plans to continue to revamp the part-time employment framework to reduce costs to licensing and facilitate the registration of home-based employment activities so as "to promote labor market flexibility and so expand employment opportunities for new labor-market entrants (including youth and women)" (Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies 2019).¹⁴

Facilitation of access to child-care services is the second component for improving women's employment conditions. Indeed, as discussed in Section II, the lack of childcare services constitutes an important constraint on women's supply. Obviously such an expansion of services requires public financing. The current strategy, however, is limited to the establishment of childcare centers at workplaces,¹⁵ without any prioritization of the sector as an area of public investment. The World Bank DPF program emphasizes the need for continued on public investment even in the context of fiscal consolidation efforts, yet the focus is on "traditional public investment areas" (World Bank 2018):

¹³ See UN Women (2018) for further discussion on flexible work – flexible care leaves options for male and female employees.

¹⁴ Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, Attachment to the Letter of Intent to IMF signed by the Minister of Finance and Governor of Central Bank, dated April 18, 2019.

¹⁵ <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2019/06/04/us145-billion-to-promote-inclusive-growth-and-job-creation-in-jordan>

“(DPL will) support the Government’s fiscal consolidation efforts by focusing on efficiency in public investment, ensuring maximum opportunities for private investment in traditional public investment areas through the adoption of a Maximizing Finance for Development approach, and updating the approach to managing debt and contingent liabilities. With a significant fiscal consolidation pending in the medium term, fiscal space for public investment will likely be limited. Yet Jordan needs significant amounts of investment to boost growth and to improve the efficiency of the economy. Jordan will have to seek efficiency gains in public investment and to significantly increase its reliance on the private sector, through making effective the newly-adopted Public Investment Management – Public-Private Partnership (PIM-PPP) Governance Framework. At the same time, Jordan needs to make progress in managing emerging contingent liabilities as part of an updated approach to managing public investment and debt.”

As explained earlier, it is of utmost importance that efforts to improve the efficiency of public investments focus not exclusively on “*traditional public investment areas*” such as physical infrastructure, but also focus on investing in social care service expansion, in particular childcare. A gendered approach to public investment and spending would entail a more balanced sectoral allocation of the national budget. This is calls for a gender budgeting approach to national budgets at the macro level. It should be noted here that the General Budget Department has attempted gender budgeting in the past decade by requesting public sector institutions to file a separate annex to expenditure for women and youth. Unfortunately, this has been done in an ineffective manner by multiplying the various expenditure items with the female share of the population (JNCW 2019).

In the meantime, Jordan is the first country in which an explicitly gendered conditionality has been included in an IMF loan program, namely to increase subsidies to nurseries to increase female labor force participation. However, while Jordan’s 2017 Budget Law did include an increase in nursery subsidies, it was minimal and will not achieve the expected results, especially when analyzed in the context of the rest of the program’s cuts in subsidies and wage bills, targeting of social protection, and regressive taxation (UN Women 2018).

Hence the conditionality, while a much welcome measure, needs to go beyond paying lip service.¹⁶

As part of this impetus, the Government is working on legal reform proposals to remove any potential discrimination between mothers and fathers regarding daycare requirements, and establish paternity leave. On daycare centers, the labor law previously mandated that firms with more than 20 female employees provide daycare for children under five, and the Parliament recently approved an amendment to the code so that this article applies to employees of either sex; and the recent labor code amendments also require government to undertake measures to ensure that for smaller firms, effective daycare options are provided within the local community, and also to establish paternity leave (MEFP 2019).¹⁷

A legislative reform which was undertaken recently entailed the removal of all references to gender in Ministry of Labor instructions that can be used to discriminate against women. Another policy intervention proposed for improving women’s employment entails lowering costs of employment for special groups such as women and youth. IMF (2019) proposes that such an employment subsidy can be undertaken through lowering payroll taxes, namely cuts on social security contributions, currently at almost 21.75% in Jordan. This might serve as a policy option for the next 3-5 years given that the social security system is currently at a surplus (of 3.5%).

Beyond public expenditures and structural reforms, an important component of the fiscal consolidation initiative entailed reforms on the revenue (taxation) side. The following section provides an overview of the recent tax reform in Jordan and explores its gendered impact.

16 Jordan also has a Public Works Program as part of active labor market measures. The job creation in this program can be expanded to include social care service jobs and training. See examples from other countries such as Macedonia and Greece.

17 This was further amended under the recent Labor Law 2019 during the finalization of this research report.

IV. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE JORDANIAN TAX REFORM FROM A GENDER PERSPECTIVE

IV.A. Conceptual framework: Taxation and gender equality

As discussed in the previous section, public expenditures and taxation for public revenues are the two tools of fiscal policy with income distributive outcomes. We have already undertaken a brief discussion of the expenditure side above. This section will focus on the taxation side, and will undertake and assessment of the gender distributive effects of the recent tax reform in Jordan, which is a primary focus of this report.

The taxation system has the potential to redistribute income in an equality enhancing manner through progressive taxation, i.e. taxing those with higher ability to pay at increasingly higher rates. The progressiveness of taxation is dependent on a number of factors. Primarily, indirect taxation (consumption tax) is generally regressive since it imposes a uniform tax rate on all consumers and does not differentiate according to the ability to pay. For any given level of necessary consumption expenditures, those individuals with lower incomes end up paying a higher share of their income as sales tax. This is unlike direct taxation (income tax) that can be applied in a progressive manner. Even at a uniform income tax rate, the absolute amount of taxes paid increases with income. Generally, most income taxation systems apply also increasing tax rates with higher incomes. Hence it is generally preferable to have direct taxation as the main source of tax revenues rather than indirect taxation. This was indeed one of the critiques of the initial proposals for the Jordanian tax reform, which entailed rises in sales taxes on basic consumption items such as food and fuel. In the second round of reforms, further proposals on the sales tax were canceled and the new

legislation focused on corporate and personal income taxes.

A gendered framework for the analysis of taxation, first of all, builds upon an assessment of whether the tax system is progressive (taxing those with more ability to pay at higher rates). This is because gender along with socioeconomic status is a fundamental crosscutting dimension of inequalities in access to jobs, incomes and wealth. This means women tend to be more heavily represented at the bottom of the income distribution, and as such a progressive (regressive) taxation system benefits (hurts) women in particular.

At the same time, however, there are a number of independent gendered effects of tax policy which are operational primarily through the gender division of labor, i.e. women's structural positioning in the household, primarily responsible for unpaid work and men's positioning in the labor market primarily responsible for paid work. Hence a gendered analysis requires going beyond a conventional assessment of the '(household) income' progressiveness of taxation. The conceptual framework described below for assessment of gender implications of tax reform in Jordan is built on pioneering work by Grown and Valodia (2010) and Stotsky and Asegedech (1997).

A gender analysis of taxation distinguishes between explicit and implicit bias. Explicit gender bias refers to tax regulations that treat men and women differently, mostly found in direct taxation (personal income tax). For example, a tax regulation that allows only male breadwinners to claim an exemption on the basis of dependents, but not women taxpayers. To the extent that gender (and other) discrimination is banned constitutionally in most countries, such

explicit discrimination is relatively rare. As will be discussed below in the case of Jordan, however, even when tax law does not entail explicitly gender discriminatory language, in implementation, the widespread interpretation of the ‘breadwinner’ concept in terms of the patriarchal family can serve as a source of explicit discrimination.

More prevalent are implicit forms of gender bias where the tax law and its implementation seems neutral, but given the structural gender gaps in employment, earnings and wealth ownership, a specific tax regulation may have different impacts on men and women. A common example is personal versus joint filing systems for personal income tax. The joint filing requirements entail an implicit gender bias in that they tax the secondary-earner income (primarily women’s) at a higher marginal tax rate than primary-earner income. This poses a disincentive to women’s decisions to participate in the labor market and it encourages single (male) breadwinner households over dual-earner households. Similarly, scheduler taxation, i.e. differentiating personal income taxation by the source of income (imposing different tax rates on wage vs. self-employment vs. rent/interest income) might entail gendered effects given women and men have different patterns of employment and ownership.¹⁸ For instance, given women are less likely to be rent/interest income earners, higher (lower) taxation of rent/interest income is likely to increase (decrease) men’s tax liability relative to women.

Another common example of implicit gender bias in taxation entails indirect taxation. Indirect taxes, namely sales or consumption tax, are generally regressive as explained above. In so far as women are concentrated at the lower end of the income distribution, a tax system dependent on indirect taxation is likely to carry an implicit gender bias taxing women’s incomes at higher rates. Also sales taxes imposed on basic consumption goods are likely to weigh more heavily on women given their traditional roles as primary caretakers of families. In addition, given gender differences in spending behavior (empirical work from around the world provide evidence that women generally spend higher shares of their income on children and family wellbeing, while men spend relatively more on luxury consumption), sales taxes on different consumption

items are also likely to have differential gender impact. As such indirect taxation can also be a tool for gender-equalizing outcomes. A good example is South Africa, where basic food items and paraffin (the primary energy source for household work such as cooking) are zero-rated in contrast to high taxes on alcohol and tobacco (Casale 2012).

The proceeding section focuses on a gender analysis of the tax reform in Jordan, which took place in 2018-2019, in particular the changes in personal income tax. We place the analysis in the above-described conceptual framework to answer the following questions:

1. Do the tax laws in Jordan entail any explicit gender discrimination?
2. Is the personal income tax (PIT) filed on a joint versus individual basis?
3. Are the recent changes in PIT exemption thresholds and reorganization of tax brackets likely to result in differential impact on tax liabilities of women versus men?
4. How does the lowering of PIT exemption thresholds and reorganization of tax brackets affect tax liabilities of different types of households, in terms of
 - a. vertical equity (taxing those with higher ability to pay at higher rates)?;
 - b. horizontal equity (taxing households with the same income but with different gender and employment composition at different rates)?;
 - c. in particular, do dual earner households and single mother households suffer a tax disadvantage vis-à-vis the traditional male breadwinner household?
5. Are there any gender effects of indirect taxation given women’s versus men’s expenditure patterns?
6. What does an overall review of the taxation system reveal in terms of efficiency of revenue raising, relative reliance on direct versus indirect taxation, progressiveness of taxation?

¹⁸ The alternative to ‘scheduler taxation’ is ‘global taxation’ where the same rules and rate are applied independent of the source of income.

IV.B. Recent Tax Reform in Jordan

The new Jordanian Tax Law no. 38 approved by the Jordanian Parliament on 2 December, which amended the Income Tax Law no. 34 for the year 2014 became effective from 1 January 2019 onwards. The new law entailed lowering of tax thresholds and increasing of income tax rates for personal as well as business and corporate income.

The corporate income tax rate for companies operating in the industrial sector has been increased to 20% from 14%, except for those operating in specific sectors such as manufacturing of medicine and clothing which are subject to corporate income tax rate reductions. The corporate income tax rate for companies established in development zones has been increased from 5% to 10%, with the exception of those which undertake industrial manufacturing activities (they will continue to be subject to the corporate income tax rate of 5%).¹⁹ The Amended Law also introduces a “national contribution tax”, on the taxable income of all legal persons and individuals at specific rates, depending on the industry sector/type of activity. In the case of individuals, a flat tax rate of 1% is applied only to those high-income earners with annual incomes exceeding JOD 200 thousand. In the case of businesses, it applies uniformly to all at different flat rates depending on the sector (ranging from 7% in mining to 2% in telecommunications and insurance; 1% in most other sectors). While the focus of this gender assessment of tax reform is the personal income tax, we should note that this flat national contribution tax for businesses might have a regressive (inequality enhancing) impact since small- and medium-scale enterprises are imposed the same tax rate as larger businesses. Given that women tend to manage smaller enterprises; it may also prevail a gendered impact.

Table 4 below shows the changes in personal income taxation. Personal income entails all forms of income earned from salaries, rent, services, commercial activity, or any other taxable income taking into consideration that absolute tax is imposed on number of income types (interest on bank’s deposits,

¹⁹ To access the 5% corporate income tax rate, the activities performed should contribute to an incremental 30% increase in the “value” of the products procured locally (the amount of the increase to the “value” is typically confirmed with the Ministry of Industry and Trade).

prizes, and lottery).²⁰ The changes in personal income taxation entail the reduction of annual exemption thresholds as well as reorganizing of tax brackets and the applicable tax rates. Accordingly, the annual exemption for personal income taxation of resident individuals and dependents has been reduced from JOD 12,000 to JOD 10,000 for the year 2019 and further to JOD 9,000 for all subsequent years (Article 9A-1 and A-2). The definition of “dependent” includes “the taxpayer’s spouse, children, ancestors or relatives up to the second degree supported by the taxpayer” (JMoF 2019, p.3). Hence the effective exemption for an income earner with a dependent in 2019 is JOD 20,000 (JOD 10,000 for individuals and an additional JOD 10,000 for dependents) and JOD 18,000 for all subsequent years.

An additional exemption conditional on presentation of proof of taxpayer’s expenditures on medical treatment, education, rent, interest on the housing loans and murabaha on housing was revised as follows. Previously this was available up to a maximum of JOD 4,000 per taxpayer. The new law allocates expenditures specific exemptions between the taxpayer and his/her dependents from 2020 onwards as follows (Article 9A-3):²¹

- Taxpayer: JOD 1,000;
- Spouse of taxpayer: JOD 1,000;
- Each child of taxpayer: JOD 1,000 for each child and capped at JOD 3,000.

Married couples can choose to file jointly or individually and the law openly states that joint filing is not permitted without the consent of the spouses. The taxpayer definition under both the old and the new law is gender-neutral. Prior to the amendment, however, implementation could be discriminatory as the female breadwinners could be denied the breadwinner certificate from the Supreme Judge Department of the religious courts. Under the pre-reform implementation, a woman could take the breadwinner certificate based on proof that she

²⁰ The interest and dividend income received by natural persons from stocks and shares of limited liability and partnership companies, holding companies, public and private joint stock companies located in Jordan are exempted from taxes (written communication with the Jordanian Tax Department, Ministry of Finance, June 2019).

²¹ Technical services and legal services expenses will not be subject to this exemption under the Amended Law.

is the only breadwinner in the family, i.e. that her husband or ex-husband (if she is divorced) or father/ brother are unemployed with no income at all or she is a widow with no other breadwinner in the family. Despite the gender-neutral language of the old tax law, this conditionality was applied by the tax authorities to women (unlike men) based on personal status law, which assumes main breadwinner to be men even when there are also employed women in the household.²²

With the recent amendment, there is now an explicit acknowledgement of “female breadwinner taxpayer” and her right to exemptions under the new paragraph E of Article 9. Under the new law, in dual earner households, it is up to the spouses to either have one of them obtain the breadwinner tax exemption or for both to share it. The exemption is to be divided depending on the percentage of support (provided supporting receipts/documents are submitted); otherwise, it is divided equally between the breadwinners. In the former case, breadwinner certification is still required, and the personal status law keeps the loophole of defining the breadwinner status for men.²³

Another problematic aspect of the law pertains to states that the maximum ceiling for total exemptions that “spouses” can collectively benefit whether filing jointly or separately (Article 9B-1). Under the 2014 law this was specified as JOD 28,000 and reduced further to JOD 23,000 with the 2018 amendment (JMoF 2019, p.12). However, there is no maximum ceiling foreseen for multiple taxpayer households other than spouses. For example, for a household of taxpayers with an employed husband and a dependent wife, plus a secondary earner such as a son/daughter or any other family member living in the same household, there is no ceiling imposed on their joint collective exemptions. If however, both spouses are employed and filing individually, they can claim exemptions up to a maximum ceiling of JOD 23,000.²⁴ There were critiques that this was discriminatory against dual earner couples, and that the ceiling for spouses’ combined exemptions should be removed.

22 Comments on draft report by JNCW.

23 Ibid.

24 The PWC interpretation of the new law (<http://taxsummaries.pwc.com/ID/Jordan-Individual-Deductions>), which was one of the sources used in this report for an assessment of the changes under the reform, is as follows: “A maximum ceiling for total exemptions that a taxpayer (or a household of taxpayers) can collectively benefit should not exceed JOD 23,000.” In the English translation of the new tax law on the Ministry of Finance website (<https://www.istd.gov.jo/English/Legislations/Laws.aspx>), however, the maximum ceiling is valid only for spouses under Article 9/C.

TABLE 4:
Personal Income Tax Reform 2018

	Previous Law	New Law	
		2019	2020 onwards
Personal exemption	JOD 12,000	JOD 10,000	JOD 9,000
Dependents exemption	JOD 12,000	JOD 10,000	JOD 9,000
Married Couples	Joint or individual filing; Explicit statement that joint filing not permitted without the consent of the spouses (Article 9B-2)		
Tax payer (Breadwinner) definition	Gender-neutral definition of taxpayer; In implementation, women cannot obtain breadwinner certificate by the Family Registration Office from female breadwinners (as required proof by the tax authorities); hence maybe denied exemptions for dependents. ²⁵	Explicit acknowledgement of “Female breadwinner taxpayer” and her right to exemptions (Article 9E) In the case of multiple breadwinner-taxpayers, dependents exemption to be divided depending on the percentage of support (provided supporting receipts/documents are submitted); otherwise, it is divided equally between the breadwinners.	
Dependent definition	The taxpayer’s spouse, children, ancestors, or relatives up to the second-degree supported by the taxpayer.		
Additional exemptions for expenses	JOD 4,000 per taxpayer for expenses on medication, education, rent, home loan interest and murabaha, and technical, engineering and legal services.	JOD 1,000 for the individual, 1,000 for the spouse, and 1,000 for each child up to 3,000 at a maximum for expenses on medication, education, rent, home loan interest, and murabaha (other services omitted in the new law).	
Ceiling on total exemptions of multiple taxpayer households	Total exemptions for spouses up to a maximum ceiling of JOD 28,000	Total exemptions for spouses up to a maximum ceiling of JOD 23,000	
Tax Brackets	7% on the first JOD 10,000	5% on the first JOD 5,000 10% on the next JOD 5,000	
	14% on the next JOD 10,000	15% on the next JOD 5,000 20% on the next JOD 5,000	
	20% on amounts exceeding JOD 20,000	25% on amounts exceeding JOD 20,000 and up to JOD 1 million 30% for amounts exceeding JOD 1 million A new national contribution tax of 1% on amounts exceeding JOD 200,000	

Source: Compiled by the Authors from Ernst and Young (2018), PwC Jordan (2018) and JMoF (2019).

²⁵ Ibid.

The motivation for the income tax reform of 2018 was to widen the tax base given that the overwhelming majority of Jordanian citizens remained under the tax thresholds. Despite the lowering of tax thresholds and reorganization of the tax brackets towards higher tax rates, estimations by different sources show that the majority of Jordanians will continue to remain outside of the PIT net. It is estimated that 90% (FES 2018) to 92% (IMF 2019) of all Jordanians will remain exempt from direct taxation under the new law versus about 95% under the old law. These estimations do not entail a gender breakdown, which is one of the findings reported in the following subsection. Nevertheless, those in favor of the tax reform deem it as a critical step forward in ensuring a more sustainable and fairer tax system because it shifts the burden of adjustment away from consumption (which tends to hurt the lower income groups) and towards those with greater capacity to pay. Despite these efforts, however, taxation in Jordan continues to depend heavily on sales taxes, which constitute at least two thirds of revenues (FES 2018, p.29).

The tax reform also entails a critical focus on increasing efficiency in tax collection through tax-compliance improvement projects (such as strengthening of penalties on non-compliance). The reform is expected to increase tax revenues by a permanent yield of about 0.8% of GDP through broadening the tax base of the personal (0.2%) and corporate (0.5%) income tax bases and undertaking measures towards the reduction of tax evasion (0.1%) (IMF 2019). A new tax compliance measure, which also entail imprisonment penalties (Article 66) is based on the number of non-compliance crimes rather than the amount of tax evasion. Given that the penalty is independent of the amount of the tax evasion, it favors those with higher income and who usually have more financial management capacity for tax evasion.

The revisions of the general sales tax were undertaken in 2017 and 2018. They entailed the gradual removal of exemptions and increasing the sales tax rates on items other than basic food commodities and health and education supplies to minimize the impact on the poor. The lowest segments of household consumption have been exempted from the application of the automatic electricity tariff adjustment mechanism. The sales tax was increased from a lower range of 0%-8% to 10%-16% on many consumer items including food and beverages. The sales tax on packaged dairy

products, eggs, and fruits was increased to 10% from a previous GST ranging from 0% to 4%. The sales tax on essential food commodities such as sugar, rice, flour, cooking oil, lamb, beef, chicken, fish, fresh milk, tea, remained unchanged at 0% (with also the objective of promoting domestic production) (USDA 2018).

IV.C. Personal Income Tax Reform from a Gender Perspective

To the best of our knowledge, the only gender analysis of the recent tax reform in Jordan is a policy brief by a civil society organization on the basis of the draft law prior to its adoption by the Parliament in late 2018. The main assessments of the policy brief are as follows (Karak Castle 2018, p.2):

1. *Lack of a definition of female breadwinner in the draft law; the draft does not refer to how to calculate exemptions or taxes on this group of taxpayers and there are no provisions on the divorced women or widow supporting her parents.*
2. *The draft law does not include any direct indication on gender, except for the case of tax return, and the provision on mutual consent on joint returns was repealed contrary to the previous laws.*
3. *Women usually spend more on goods subject to general sales tax, as women often purchase household stuff, clothes, cosmetics, and toys. As a result, women are more affected by taxes as they pay both income tax and GST.*
4. *The draft income tax law contradicts with the economic stimulation plan, especially for women, as most pro-women projects are not tax exempt, leading women to quit searching for jobs due to lack of economic feasibility (e.g. nurseries and home workers are not tax-exempt)."*

The analysis in this section uses data from the Jordanian household surveys to explore the above issues raised in this policy brief in more detail and within the more comprehensive framework of the guiding empirical questions on gender and taxation presented at the beginning of this section. To reiterate, the differential impact of changes in income tax exemptions and brackets by vertical differentiation (across taxpayers by different levels of income) and by horizontal differentiation (across different types

of households with the same level of income); the differential impact of the changes in sales taxes due to different expenditure patterns by gender.

We have two main sources of micro data for our analysis on the gender impact of tax reform: the Jordanian Labor Market Panel Survey (JLMPS) 2016 and the Household Expenditures and Income Survey (HEIS) 2013/2014.²⁶ It should be noted outright that the most appropriate database for analysis of the potential impact of the income tax reform from a gender and socioeconomic equality perspective would be actual official administrative tax data. Given the lack of researcher access to such administrative files however, survey data is the best next alternative.

We conduct the analysis of gender impact of the 2019 income tax reform on the basis of wage and salary earnings due to restrictions of the household micro data on other sources of income.²⁷ However, taking wages and salaries as the basis of the analysis is defensible given that majority (more than 90%) of total employment in Jordan is in wage and salary employment (discussed in Section II). Approximately 60% of all Jordanian households have at least one wage and salary earner.²⁸ We inflate all earnings, income and expenditures observed in the micro data to 2018 using the officially reported consumer price index.²⁹

To have insights into how the lowering of PIT exemption thresholds and reorganization of tax brackets affect tax liabilities of women versus men, we look at the gender-disaggregated distribution of wage and salary earners by pre- versus post-reform tax thresholds and brackets. Table 5 presents this distribution on the basis of net wages and salaries since this is the only income data available in JLMPS. Such a distribution with respect to tax liability would ideally be taken on the basis of gross wages, however the difference between gross and net wages

is relatively small with net wages corresponding to almost 85% of gross wages even in the case of very high salary brackets as reported by a highly selective salary survey.³⁰ Taking gross wages, the impact of increased taxation would be somewhat higher. Another source of underestimation is that survey data tends to underreport higher income earners. On the other hand, the assessment of increasing tax liability on the basis of individual basis also entails an overestimation bias in the opposite direction since tax exemptions on the basis of dependents is not taken into consideration.

Given that the main objective of this report is to assess any gendered impact, however, we are interested in seeing whether the changes in the absolute numbers as well as the share of wage and salary earners whose tax liability increases as a result of the tax reform is higher for women than for men. The simultaneous under- and over-estimation biases in income reporting are less likely to have any systematic impact on the gender distribution. A striking observation in Table 5 is that both before and after the reform the overwhelming majority of both male and female wage and salary earners are below the exemption threshold. Before the tax reform, 96.3% of all workers (97.8% of women and 96.0% of men) were below the exemption threshold of JOD 12,000. As the threshold is lowered progressively to JOD 9,000, 4.1% of the wage and salary earners (approximately 42 thousand) become tax-liable, yet a majority (92.3%) of all wage and salary earners continue to remain tax-exempt post-reform.³¹ As for the gender breakdown 5,794 additional women (2.8% of female workers) become tax liable, with 95.0% remaining still under the threshold. As for men, 35,906 additional workers (4.4% of male workers) become tax liable, with 91.6% remaining still under the threshold.

The tax bracket JOD 12,000-15,000 is the only one where the income tax rate is reduced (from 7% to 5%). This entails only a small share of workers; 0.9% of women (1,901) and 1.4% of men (11,235). For the rest of the income groups, the tax rate has increased:

26 The micro data of LMPS 2016 and HEIS 2013/2014 was obtained from the Economic Research Forum (ERF). The most recent round of HEIS was conducted in 2017/2018, however, the micro data was not available from Department of Statistics (DOS) of Jordan.

27 HEIS 2013/2014 micro data obtained from ERF contains other sources of income but it is available for only at the household level which makes gender disaggregation impossible.

28 Derived from JLMPS 2016 micro data by the authors.

29 We use CPI 2016 (115.49 indicating negative inflation from 116.40 in 2015; the base year 2010: CPI=100), 2017 (119.33) and 2018 (124.66); see <http://dosweb.dos.gov.jo/economic/price-indices/table-price-indices/>

30 See: <https://www.averagesalarysurvey.com/jordan>

31 This estimate of the share of income earners who move into tax liability as a result of the income tax reform (4%) is similar to the estimates by other sources reported earlier in this section (p.32): 3% by IMF (from 95% of income earners being below exemption threshold pre-reform to 92% post-reform) and 5% by FES (from 95% to 90%).

from no taxation to 5% for the lowest income group of newly tax-liable workers. From 7% to 10% for 0.2% of women (468) and 1.3% of men (10,524); from 7% to 15% for 0.1% of women (178) and 0.4% of men (3,486); from 14% to 15% for 0.4% of women (864) and 0.2% of men (1,285); and so on for the rest of the income groups at ever decreasing numbers and shares of workers.

On the basis of rearranging of the tax brackets presented in Table 5, the group subject to the highest tax increase (more than a doubling of their tax rate from 7 to 15%) is the middle-to-high income group earning JOD 20,000–22,000; 0.4% of all wage and salary earners. Here again the share of women earners (0.1%) is lower than that of male earners (0.4%). A small share of workers (1.3%) in the narrow income bracket of JOD 12,000 – JOD 15,000 experience a decrease in the tax rate from 7% to 5%; 0.9% of women versus 1.4% of men earners. The higher income groups (depends on which benchmark to use, for our purposes here earning above JOD 22,000) represent only about 1% of the total wage and salary earners. Nevertheless, given that survey data underreport higher income earners, this is likely

to be an underestimation of the true impact of the income tax reform on high-income earners. Similar analysis based on official administrative income tax data would provide a more accurate picture.

These findings show that as far as a gender breakdown is concerned, the relative shares as well as the absolute number of women subject to increasing tax liabilities and rates is lower than that of men. This is due to two reasons: First, because women's labor force participation rate is very low and hence there are far fewer women wage and salary earners than men. The number of male wage and salary earners (821,578 male workers) is more than four times than that of women wage and salary earners (208,050). Second, a higher share of women wage and salary earners (95.0%) than men (91.6%) continue to remain under the new tax exemption threshold of JOD 9,000. In other words, a relatively lower potential negative impact of the income tax reform on women wage and salary earners is due to two types of gender inequalities in the labor market disfavoring women: Women face drastically more limited labor market opportunities than men and those who do find employment earn less than men.

TABLE 5:
Distribution of Wage and Salary Income Earners by Tax Brackets: Pre-2019 versus Post-2019

Wage and Salary Income Earners (in 2018-2019 JOD)		Pre-2019 PIT Rate	Post-2019 PIT Rate	Total	Cumulative Total	Women	Cumulative Women	Men %	Cumulative Men
from	to								
				1,029,628		208,050		821,578	
0	9,000	0%	0%	950,282 (92.3%)	950,282 (92.3%)	197,746 (95.0%)	197,746 (95.0%)	752,536 (91.6%)	752,536 (91.6%)
9,001	10,000	0%	5%	27,375		4,671		22,704	
10,001	12,000	0%	5%	14,325		1,123		13,202	
9,001	12,000	0%	5%	41,700 (4.1%)	991,982 (96.3%)	5,794 (2.8%)	203,540 (97.8%)	35,906 (4.4%)	788,442 (96.0%)
12,001	15,000	7%	5%	13,226 (1.3%)	1,005,208 (97.6%)	1,901 (0.9%)	205,441 (98.7%)	11,325 (1.4%)	799,767 (97.3%)
15,001	20,000	7%	10%	10,992 (1.1%)	1,016,200 (98.7%)	468 (0.2%)	205,909 (99.0%)	10,524 (1.3%)	810,291 (98.6%)
20,001	22,000	7%	15%	3,664 (0.4%)	1,019,864 (99.1%)	178 (0.1%)	206,087 (99.1%)	3,486 (0.4%)	813,777 (99.1%)
22,001	25,000	14%	15%	2,149 (0.2%)	1,022,013 (99.3%)	864 (0.4%)	206,951 (99.5%)	1,285 (0.2%)	815,062 (99.2%)
25,001	30,000	14%	20%	1,596 (0.2%)	1,023,609 (99.4%)	169 (0.1%)	207,120 (99.6%)	1,427 (0.2%)	816,489 (99.4%)
30,001	32,000	20%	25%	179 (0.0%)	1,023,788 (99.4)	---	207,120 (99.6%)	179 (0.0%)	816,668 (99.4%)
32,001	200,000	20%	25%	5,726 (0.6%)	1,029,514 (100.0%)	930 (0.4%)	208,050 (100.0%)	4,796 (0.6%)	821,464 (100.0%)
200,001	1,000,000	20%	25% (+ 1% NCT)	114 (0.01%)	1,029,628 (100.0%)	---	208,050 (100.0%)	114 (0.01%)	821,578 (100.0%)
1,000,001		20%	30% (+ 1% NCT)	---		---		---	

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata; Jordanians only.

Moving onto the next question on the impact of the income tax reform on vertical and horizontal equity across households of different income groups and compositions, we first distinguish households by gender composition, marital and employment status as shown in Table 6. First observation is that in an overwhelming majority (86%) of households the household reference person is an adult male (conventionally called 'a male headed household') versus 14% of households with a female reference

person ('female headed household').³² We should note that 'a female breadwinner household' is different than a so-called 'female-headed household' in that the former entails not only a woman as the 'the main reference person', but also she is employed and is

³² The concept of a 'household head' used in household surveys is controversial since posing a question formulated in this manner ('Who is the head of this household?') imposes the concept, assuming that there has to be a head. The more recent practice of household surveys use the concept of the 'household reference person', i.e. an adult member of the household who answers the survey questions on behalf of the rest of the household members.

the main provider of cash earnings for her family. A 'female-headed' household, on the other hand, is a household where the main reference person³³ of the household is a woman but she might not necessarily be in employment and bringing in cash earnings.

Parallel to this observation, the most prevalent household type in Jordan is that of a traditional male breadwinner. Close to half of all households (46.4%) are traditional male breadwinner households, i.e. married couple households with a male breadwinner and a dependent (i.e. non-employed) wife. Dual-earner couples constitute only 7.2% of all households in Jordan, reflective of the very low female employment rate. Female breadwinners constitute a small minority (0.7%). Cross checking the two categorizations with one another implies that a majority of male headed households have an employed head (47.4% male breadwinner out of 86% male-headed households); while only a minority of female headed households do so (0.7% female breadwinner out of 14% female-headed households).

Close to one third (29.8%) of households fall into the 'no one employed' category, a heterogeneous group consisting of pensioners, poor households living on transfers as well as presumably a small share of households with income other than wage and salary earnings. The 'others' category entails households where there is at least one member in employment but not the household head (mostly the children). A striking observation in Table 5 is that the mean (or median) annual income of dual earner households is almost the double that of single male or female breadwinner households. This can be interpreted as an outcome of two factors at work: First, simply having both the husband and wife in employment doubles the income of the household. Second, given that the majority of women in employment are higher educated and assuming assortative mating (i.e. people tend to marry partners with similar education level), the dual earner households are typically those where the couple is highly educated and hence with higher wage and salary levels.

33 See footnote 31 for definition of household reference person.

TABLE 6:
Household Classification by Household Head, Employment Status and Sex Composition

	Total	Household Reference Person		Household Employment Categories Composition						
		Men	Women	Dual Earner	Male Breadwinner		Female Breadwinner		No One Employed	Others
					Married	Not Married	Married	Not Married		
No of Households	1,416,214 (100%)	1,217,968 (86.0%)	198,246 (14.0%)	102,376 (7.2%)	656,800 (46.4%)	14,358 (1.0%)	1,662 (0.1%)	9,124 (0.6%)	422,275 (29.8%)	209,719 (14.8%)
% HHs w/ wage/salary income	56.0	59.4	35.4	97.1	73.0	73.2	68.2	92.4	0.02	89.9
% of HHs w/ children	67.4	73.6	29.3	84.7	86.1	13.2	88.3	50.3	45.6	48.9
Median*	5,181	5,181	4,922	9,714	5,181	5,181	5,181	5,828	---	5,181
Mean*	7,120	7,222	6,076	11,552	6,411	6,259	4,907	6,588	---	6,692

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 micro data; Jordanians only.

* Incomes are inflated to 2019.

In order to explore the extent to which the tax incidence varies across households of different gender and employment composition, we use a more detailed classification of six types of households:

- (Single) Male breadwinner household: A married co-habiting couple with husband employed, wife a full-time homemaker and two school age children;
- Dual breadwinner household: A married co-habiting couple where both husband and the wife are employed and two school age children (with two variations, one where the husband and wife earn equal wages; and one where the husband earns more than the wife);
- (Multiple) Male breadwinner household: A married co-habiting couple with husband employed, wife a full-time homemaker, one school age child, one adult co-habiting child (son/daughter or other blood relative) also employed;
- Single mother breadwinner household: Single mother (non-married, separated, divorced, widowed) employed with 2 school age children;

- Single father breadwinner household: Single father (non-married, separated, divorced, widowed) employed with 2 school age children.³⁴

To the extent that the income tax reform increases tax liability of the dual earner households more than the single male breadwinner households, it would pose an additional impediment to women's integration into the labor market given their structural second earner position. In a parallel manner, to the extent that the post-reform tax rate experienced by a female breadwinner household increases relatively more than the other types of households, single, separated, divorced or widowed women are penalized.

³⁴ Single breadwinner households with dependent children, whether with a male or a female head, would be subject to the same income tax exemptions and rates at any given level of income. However, since only a small minority of single male breadwinners has small children (13.2%), we focus on single female breadwinners.

TABLE 7:
Pre-versus Post-Reform Income Tax Rates by Household Type and Income

Annual Income	Mean Income*	Higher Income (20,000 JOD)	High Income (30,000 JOD)	Highest Income (40,000 JOD)
Type of Household	Post-Tax Reform (tax paid as a share of gross income %)			
(Single) Male Breadwinner, dependent spouse, 2 children	0.0	0.0	1.8	5.0
Dual Breadwinner (husband and wife employed with equal wages), 2 children	0.0	0.0	1.3	3.0
Dual Breadwinner (husband and wife employed; H earns >W)** (H tax rate; W tax rate)	0.0	0.1 (0.2; 0.0)	1.7 (2.7; 0.0)	4.9 (5.8; 3.3)
(Multiple) Male breadwinner, dependent spouse + 2 nd earner son/daughter + 1 child	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.0
Single Mother Breadwinner, no dependent spouse, 2 children	0.0	0.0	2.0	6.0
Single Father Breadwinner, no dependent spouse, 2 children	0.0	0.0	2.0	6.0
	Pre-Tax Reform (tax paid as a share of gross income %)			
(Single) Male Breadwinner, dependent spouse, 2 children	0.0	0.0	0.5	2.0
Dual Breadwinner (husband and wife employed with equal wages), 2 children	0.0	0.0	0.9 (1.4; 0.0)	1.8 (2.9; 0.9)
Dual Breadwinner (husband and wife employed; H earns > W),** 2 children (H tax rate; W tax rate)	0.0	0.0	0.5	2.0
(Multiple) Male breadwinner, dependent spouse + 2 nd earner son/daughter + 1 child	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5
Single Mother Breadwinner, no dependent spouse, 2 children	0.0	2.0	5.0	8.0
Single Father Breadwinner, no dependent spouse, 2 children	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0

Source: Authors' calculations; see Appendix III for examples of income tax calculations.

* The mean income is based on 2020 prices to reflect the post-reform situation, with the 2019 CPI-based inflation rate assumed to remain the same as 2018. Based on JLMPS, the mean annual wage and salary income by household type are as follows: JOD 6,539 for single male breadwinner households; JOD 6,882 for female breadwinner households; JOD 12,068 for dual earner households.

** The gender wage gap is taken as 0.6 (ratio of female to male wages) observed for university graduates in JLMPS 2016.

Table 7 shows the hypothetical tax incidence experienced by the different types of households at different levels of income, progressively increasing from the mean income for each type of household up to a maximum of JOD 40,000. There are three types of comparisons entailed here:

- Vertical equality of the income taxation: If higher income households are taxed at higher rates (reading from left to right holding household type constant but allowing income to vary);

- Horizontal equality of the income taxation: If households of different composition are taxed at different rates despite having the same income (reading from top to bottom holding income constant but allowing household type to vary);
- Pre- versus post-reform impact: If there have been changes in vertical or horizontal equality through the income tax reform (comparing the upper and lower half of the table).

Comparing the same type of household across the different income levels (reading from left to right across each row), we see that both in the pre- and post-reform context, income taxation is generally progressive, as income increases, households are obliged to pay a higher share of their income as taxes. Yet the progressivity starts to apply at income levels much higher than the mean. Once the exemptions are taken into consideration, a relatively wide range of incomes from the mean income up to JOD 20,000, remains outside of tax liability. One exception in the post-reform situation for dual earner households is where the husband earns more than the wife.

The progressivity of income taxation seems to have been enhanced through the tax reform. In the post-reform situation, the tax rates experienced by all types of high-income households increase; for example, for single male breadwinners at the high income level of JOD 30,000, from 0.5% to 1.8%; for dual earners with equal wages from 0.5% to 1.3%. Nevertheless, households with low and middle income (the majority of Jordanian households) continue to remain below tax thresholds in the post-reform period.

Comparing different types of households at the same income level (reading from top to bottom across each column), we are able to assess the horizontal equity of the tax system. There is no change in the tax rates faced by different types of households –whether male breadwinner, dual earner or single mother/father households- at lower levels of income. In the post-reform period all types of households continue to remain tax exempt at the mean to low-middle income level. The only exception is dual breadwinner with a gender wage gap and at JOD 20,000 total income, which moves from being tax exempt to into tax liability at 0.1%.

At higher levels of income (JOD 30,000 and 40,000), first comparing single male breadwinners to dual earner households in the pre-reform period, the dual

earners with a mean gender wage gap of 0.6 are taxed at the same rate as single male breadwinners (0.5% or 2%). Dual earners with equal wages, on the other hand, are either at a slight disadvantage vis-à-vis single male breadwinners (0.9% vs. 0.5% for JOD 30,000) or at a slight advantage (1.8% vs. 2.0% for JOD 40,000). In the post-reform situation, lowering of exemption thresholds for dependents, imposes lower tax increases on dual earner families than single male breadwinners and puts dual earners at an advantage (1.3% tax rate for dual earners vs. 1.8% for single male breadwinner with income of JOD 30,000; and 3.0% vs. 5.0% for JOD 40,000). This advantage starts to erode with the emergence of a gender wage gap.

As for single parent households, an implicit discrimination against single mothers prior to the reform has been remedied in the post-reform period. As discussed above, under the pre-reform implementation, women were unable to obtain a breadwinner certificate from the Family Registration Office and hence were unable to claim dependent benefits despite the gender-neutral definition of 'breadwinner' in the previous income tax law. As such our examples show how single mothers were subject to taxation (ranging from 2% for JOD 20,000 to 8% for JOD 40,000); while single fathers were exempt except for very high levels of income such as JOD 40,000 where they still paid less than single mothers. The new law explicitly recognizes women as breadwinners, such that the tax rates for single mothers are reduced and also equalized to that of fathers in the post-reform period (2% and 6% respectively for JOD 30,000 and JOD 40,000). Nevertheless, single parent households now pay a slightly higher tax rate than male breadwinner or dual earner households.

An interesting observation here has to do with male breadwinner households with a dependent spouse but which have earners in addition to the husband, such as adult sons/daughters. They enjoy an advantage not only vis-à-vis single male breadwinners but also dual earners, since spouses face a maximum limit of JOD 23,000 on collective exemptions. For example, a multiple male breadwinner household with income of JOD 30,000 remains tax-exempt while a dual breadwinner with the same income face a tax rate of 1.3%-1.7%. The gap is pronounced at higher income levels. This favors a father-and-son employed household over a husband-and-wife employed household; an implicit gender discrimination.

IV.D. Indirect (Sales) Taxation from a Gender Perspective

Indirect taxation in Jordan entails the general sales tax (GST) and the special sales tax (SST). GST is at the average level of 16%, with reductions applied to specific goods and services at 10%, 5% and 4% and 0%. The consumption items that are subject to reductions include necessity consumer goods such as school materials, oils and ghee (taxed at 4%), corn (taxed at 5%), dairy products, salt, gasoline (taxed at 10%). Wheat, bread, electricity, education and medical services are exempt from GST. Approximately 20 types of goods and services (such as alcohol, tobacco, cars) are subject to SST (Ernst and Young 2019).³⁵

A number of revisions were undertaken in the GST and SST rates in 2017, whereby some sales tax exemptions were removed and GST rates were increased (up to 16% in some cases) for a whole bunch of goods and services. While there were proposals for further increases in the sales tax in the context of the overall tax reform in 2018, these were put on hold in view of widespread public discontent. Nevertheless, FES (2018; p.27) reports that there are still plans under discussion to adjust the GST to as much as 20%.

The composition of direct and indirect taxes in Jordan poses an important challenge in terms of the fairness of the tax system. A study conducted by the Al-Razzaz government on the composition of the taxes in Jordan, found that the revenues were highly dependent on indirect taxation under the current standing law from 2014, with approximately two thirds to three quarters (65-76%) raised through indirect taxes and only one third to a quarter raised through direct taxes (FES 2018, p.29.) While the report recommended a switch to an increase in direct taxes, it is not clear if the new reform will achieve a more balanced composition of revenues between direct and indirect taxes.

Based on expert interviews, FES (2018) reports that while a more balanced composition of tax revenues between direct and indirect taxes is supported, there are conflicting suggestions as to how to achieve

this. Some experts do not support a reduction of the sales tax (with a proposal on reducing GST from 16 to 14 percent), as it is more likely to be absorbed as extra business profit rather than price reductions benefitting consumers. Yet increasing direct taxation without a decrease in indirect taxation is bound to result in a higher overall tax burden.

Table 8 shows the share of household consumption expenditures in total household income for different income quintiles and different types of households. Similar to observations elsewhere, in Jordan too, the share of consumption expenditures in income is inversely correlated to income; the lower (higher) the household income, the higher (lower) the share of income allocated to consumption expenditures. This holds true for all household types. Overall, the low-income households in the bottom quintile spend 152% of their income on consumption, decreasing steadily for each quintile, down to 84% for the top quintile. Given that GST is a flat tax, this means lower income households spend a higher share of their income on sales taxes than higher income households. Given this inverse correlation, the sales tax acts as a regressive (inequality enhancing) form of taxation in Jordan.

35 See: 2019 Worldwide VAT, GST and Sales Tax Guide <https://www.ey.com/gl/en/services/tax/worldwide-vat--gst-and-sales-tax-guide---xmlqs?preview&XmlUrl=/ec1images/tax-guides/VAT-2019/VAT-JO.xml>

TABLE 8:
Share of Consumption Expenditures in Disposable Income by Income Quintiles and Household Type

	# of households	Total Disposable Income		Share of Expenditures in Total Disposable Income	
		Mean	Median	Mean	Median
		TOTAL			
	4,850	9,070	7,547	110.4	117.7
Male Breadwinner	2,073	8,744	7,330	114.3	122.3
Female Breadwinner	12	8,170	6,136	100.9	131.3
Dual Earner	315	13,664	12,509	89.0	88.5
		FIRST 20%			
	1,176	3,565	3,773	176.9	152.3
Male Breadwinner	412	3,956	4,169	175.1	152.8
Female Breadwinner	5	4,412	4,640	131.9	110.2
Dual Earner	8	3,397	3,802	159.9	145.8
		SECOND 20%			
	1,009	6,083	6,091	137.4	126.7
Male Breadwinner	556	6,116	6,120	135.1	125.4
Female Breadwinner	2	6,136	6,136	137.8	137.8
Dual Earner	19	6,160	6,483	130.8	118.3
		THIRD 20%			
	940	8,125	8,106	122.1	112.4
Male Breadwinner	495	8,073	8,058	124.4	114.9
Female Breadwinner	---	---	---	---	---
Dual Earner	44	8,425	8,544	117.4	103.3
		FOURTH 20%			
	905	11,045	10,928	104.4	98.8
Male Breadwinner	340	10,922	10,833	107.6	102.8
Female Breadwinner	3	10,585	10,174	78.9	86.3
Dual Earner	113	9,275	11,634	113.5	86.6
		LAST 20%			
	820	19,541	16,859	80.9	83.5
Male Breadwinner	270	19,946	17,598	79.9	82.0
Female Breadwinner	2	15,978	15,978	87.1	87.1
Dual Earner	131	18,976	16,276	80.8	85.8

Source: Authors' calculations based on HEIS 2013/2014 microdata.


Differentiated sales tax rates for necessity versus luxury goods and services, i.e. imposing exemptions or reduced rates on necessity items such as food, education or health expenditures, while taxing luxury goods and services at higher rates, is a tool whereby the regressive impact of indirect taxation can be alleviated.

Figure 4 shows total sales taxes paid by different types of households as a share of their income, whereby the sales tax is estimated at a standard fixed GST rate of 16%.³⁶ Under such an indirect taxation scenario, where a flat tax is applied to all consumer items, male breadwinner households in the bottom quintile would spend 21% of their income on the sales tax versus 11% by male breadwinner households in the highest quintile. Similarly, for dual earner households, the sales taxes as a share of disposable income would decrease from 20% in the bottom quintile to 12% in the top quintile. As for female breadwinners, share of sales tax in income declines from about 15 to 19% in the bottom two quintiles to 12% in the top two quintiles. The female breadwinner households show some irregularity; the number of observations when divided into quintiles, is very low to make reliable assessments.

While the share of consumption expenditures (Table 8) and thereof sales taxes (Figure 4) in household income vary significantly across income quintiles, they seem quite similar across different types of households within each quintile. In other words, the regressive nature of indirect taxation is consistent across all types of households, to the extent that the GST is applied in an undifferentiated manner to all consumption goods and services. This does not indicate, however, that the regressive impact of sales taxes is gender-neutral. First of all, since women are more concentrated in the lower income groups, any income regressive impact of taxation (enhancing income inequality across different income groups) automatically entails a gender regressive element (enhancing income inequality between men and women). Given the gender employment gap (for prime working age adults, a very low 18% employment rate for women versus 71% for men; see Figure 3), an overwhelming majority of women do not have access to own earnings. To the extent that they do, they are concentrated at the bottom of the wage ladder (Table 6) and earn less than men after controlling for skill/education level (Table 1). Second for a more accurate assessment of gendered impact of sales taxes, we would need to take account of the gender patterns in consumption spending and differentiate between different types of expenditures: namely necessity expenditures versus luxury expenditures.

³⁶ Differentiated tax rates for consumption items subject to reduced rates were requested from the Tax Department but not obtained in time for the writing of this report.

FIGURE 4:
Share of Sales Taxes in Total Disposable Income by Household Type and Income Quintiles:
Simulated for the Case of a flat single GST*



Source: Authors' Calculations based on HEIS 2013/2014 micro data.
* GST rate set at 16%.

As mentioned earlier, a number of necessity items such as certain food products as well as education and medical services are subject to reduced GST rates or exempt from GST. In contrast, certain luxury items such as alcohol, tobacco, cars are subject to SST. To the extent that we can assume women in Jordan spend a higher share of their income on necessity items, and men on luxury items, the differentiated sales taxation is likely to have positive income distribution outcomes by gender as observed in other countries (Casale 2012; Grown and Valodia 2010). According to a special module of the JLMPS (2016), 72% of the employed women report that the primary use of their earnings is “to help the family financially”. In response to the question “how much of your earnings do you keep for yourself,” only 7% say they keep all their earnings for themselves; almost half (46.7%) state they keep none for themselves (see Appendix II).

Income and consumption data is reported not on the individual but at the household level. Therefore, it is not possible to conduct a gender-disaggregated analysis of how individual consumption expenditures are allocated between necessity versus luxury items.

Nevertheless, some insights can be obtained by comparing different types of households; for example, male-breadwinner versus female-breadwinner versus dual earner households (Figure 5). Since we have very few observations for female breadwinner households when disaggregated by income quintiles, another categorization used here is only-men employed versus only-women employed versus both women and men employed households (Figure 6). The expectation is that in households where women have access to own earnings or more decision-making autonomy (female breadwinner/dual earner, women employed/both employed), a relatively higher share of expenditures would be directed towards necessity expenditures, a lower share would go to luxury expenditures than in male breadwinner or only men-employed households.

Figures 5 and 6 show the share of necessity versus luxury expenditures in total household expenditures by different types of households across income quintiles. Necessity items are food, education and health-related goods and services, and consumer non-durables such as clothing. Luxury items are


tobacco, alcohol, motor vehicles and gas. The first observation is that the share of luxury expenditures increases with income. In the first household categorization according to gender of breadwinner (Figure 5), households in the bottom quintile allocate only about 12-22% of their expenditures to luxury items, this increases to the range of 23-27% in the top quintile. In the second household categorization according to employment and gender composition (Figure 6), households in the bottom quintile allocate only about 16-22% of their expenditures to luxury items, this increases to the range of 21-27% in the top quintile.

As for gender effects, the findings for Jordan conform to those from other countries to a large extent in that households dependent on male earnings allocate a relatively larger share of expenditures to luxury items and lower share to necessity items compared to households dependent of female or both male and female earnings. This is the case for total as well as across most quintiles. The differences are pronounced particularly for low-income households in the bottom two quintiles. In the two bottom quintiles, only women employed households allocate 48.2 and 45.8%

of their expenditures to necessity consumption, 16.2 and 19.4% to luxury consumption; while only men employed households allocate 42.4 and 41.7% of their expenditures to necessity consumption, 22.5 and 24.1% to luxury consumption


As for dual-earner or both women and men employed households, the findings are more mixed. Overall and across income quintiles, dual earner-employed households allocate a higher share of their expenditures to necessity items than only male earner households (45.3% to 42.8% for total in Figure 5; 42.9 to 42.4% in Figure 6). Yet their luxury expenditures are of a similar scale or even higher in some cases, except for the two bottom quintiles. The lower income dual earner-employed households in the two bottom quintiles have substantially lower luxury and higher necessity expenditures than men earner-employed households. The trend is not always confirmed for the dual earners in the higher quintiles. This might be due to the fact that generally dual earner households have higher median income than male breadwinner households, overall and within each income quintile except the first quintile.

FIGURE 5:
Share of Necessity versus Luxury Expenditures in Total Expenditures by Household Type and Income Quintiles



Source: Authors' Calculations based on HEIS 2013/2014 micro data.

FIGURE 6:
Share of Necessity versus Luxury Expenditures in Total Expenditures by Household Type and Income Quintiles



Source: Authors' Calculations based on HEIS 2013/2014 micro data.

These findings on how expenditure behavior varies across not only income groups but also gender profiles of households confirms that sales taxation also entails gendered impact. Exemptions or reduced sales taxes on necessity items such as food, education, medical expenses has the potential to be a progressive tool not only for decreasing income inequality amongst households but also for narrowing the gender income gap.

IV.E Taxation Jordan from a Gender Perspective: A Summary Assessment

Table 9 uses the conceptual framework for a gender analysis of taxation systems presented at the beginning of this section, to provide a summary of the findings above on the gender review of the tax reform in Jordan. These results are further discussed in the conclusions section along with policy recommendations.

TABLE 9:
Gendered Impact of Tax Reform in Jordan

Characteristic of the Taxation System	Gender Equality Impact	Jordan Tax Reform
Source of Tax Revenues:		
Direct versus Indirect Taxation	Direct taxation generally progressive; Indirect taxation generally regressive; Given women concentrated at the bottom of the income ladder, heavy reliance on indirect taxation likely to bear a larger negative impact on women.	The recent income tax reform has facilitated a shift from indirect to direct taxes as the source of public revenues. Nevertheless Jordanian tax revenue collection continues to depend heavily on indirect taxes.
Personal Income Tax:		
Schedular versus Global Income Taxation	Differential taxation by the source of personal income: wage vs. self-employment vs. rent/interest income. Gender differential impact depends on the existence of gendered patterns of employment & asset ownership.	Jordan implements global taxation; Overwhelming majority (more than 90%) of both female and male employment is in wage and salary employment.
Business versus Personal Income Taxation	Whether income taxation is balanced between taxing business versus personal income; Gendered impact because women are much less likely to be business owners.	Business taxes were increased as well as personal income taxes; necessary to assess how the relative weight of business versus personal income tax changes in the post-tax period.
Explicit Gender Discrimination in Tax Laws and/or Implementation	Discriminatory legislation; for example women are prevented from claiming tax exemption for dependents	New tax law explicitly recognizes women as breadwinners and hence their right to dependent exemptions; hence the grounds for discriminatory practice under the old law has been eliminated.
Joint versus Individual Filing	Joint filing taxes secondary earner (i.e. structurally women) at a higher marginal tax rate; Discourages women's labor force participation and dual earner households; encourages single male breadwinner households.	Jordanian tax law provides both options; joint filing of spouses requires mutual consent. Individual filing incentivizes dual earner households (women's employment). Nevertheless, joint filing remains as an option for married couples, and is still popular in Jordan due to women's limited financial literacy. ³⁷

37 Source: Comments on draft report by JNCW.

Exemption Thresholds	Changes in tax exemption thresholds likely to have gendered impact as women are concentrated at the bottom of the income distribution.	A lower share of women wage and salary earners are likely to be impacted than men as women's earnings are concentrated at the bottom of the wage distribution (i.e. even under the new lower threshold of JOD 9,000). The lack of a gender specific impact derives from two structural gender gaps: the gender employment gap and the gender wage gap.
Income Tax Rates, Brackets and Progressive Taxation	Progressive taxation generally benefit women (as in direct vs. indirect taxation) as women generally have lower income than men. If the changes in tax rates by income groups affect more women than men depending on their distribution by income tax brackets.	Similar to above. Since the number of women in employment is much less than men (number of women in employment is less than a quarter of men's employment), fewer women earners are affected by increasing tax rates. Also given majority of women are concentrated under the new tax threshold, lower shares of women are subject to increasing tax rates in almost each income tax bracket.
Indirect taxation:		
General Sales Tax	GST is generally regressive and hence facilitates gender gaps. As women command lower income, they allocate higher share of their income to consumption expenditures and hence they bear a greater burden of indirect taxation.	Increase in GST is likely to increase gender income gaps as women in Jordan are also found to allocate a higher share of their income towards consumption expenditures than men.
Differential Sales Taxes (necessity consumption versus luxury consumption)	Women tend to spend a relatively larger share of their income on necessity goods and services for the family; lower share on luxury items for individual consumption than men (even when controlling for income level).	Women in Jordan allocate a higher share of their expenditures to necessity items such as food, education and medical services than men. The increase in GST on such necessity consumption goods and services are likely to facilitate further deepening of the gender income gap and also hurt children and families. The reductions and exemptions from sales tax for necessity consumption goods and services are likely to advantage women with lower incomes as well as their children and families.

V. CONCLUSIONS

An important structural challenge facing the Jordanian economy is its huge gender employment gap, at a staggering 53 percentage points for prime-working age (25-54) population (18.2% women versus 71.2% of prime men in this age group are employed). Women's overall employment rate is even lower at around 10% and stagnating over the past two decades. While the current economic policy framework in Jordan acknowledges the urgency of improving women's employment, the recent macroeconomic reforms entail a stabilization program based on tough austerity measures along with a structural adjustment program entailing labor market flexibilization. Such a macroeconomic environment threatens to further deepen the already substantial gender gaps rather than alleviate them. Against this background, this report has undertaken a gendered assessment of recent fiscal policies in Jordan with a focus on the tax reform.

Given data limitations, our gender review of the recent tax reform in Jordan was based on survey data on wage and salary earners only. This was a minor limitation, however, given that the majority of employment in Jordan (particularly for women) is in the status of employees rather than self-employed (or employers). Our review reveals some mixed results (see Table 8 for a summary). First of all, in terms of the personal income tax (PIT) reform, given that an overwhelming majority (more than 90%) of both female and male wage and salary earners are concentrated at the bottom of the wage distribution, the lowering of the tax exemption thresholds (for individuals without dependents from JOD 12,000 to 9,000) seems to have affected a relative minority of workers (4.1% of total wage and salary employees). A gender disaggregated analysis shows that the share of low-wage workers who become tax liable post-reform is slightly higher for men (4.4% male wage and salary earners) than for female workers (2.8% of female wage and salary earners).

The fact that the tax reform has a relatively lower impact on women (both in terms of absolute numbers and share of wage and salary earners) derives from two types gender inequalities to start with: First,

the gender employment gap; women's labor force participation rate is very low and hence there are far fewer women wage and salary earners than men. The number of male wage and salary earners (821,578 male workers) is more than four times than that of women wage and salary earners (208,050). Hence the increasing tax liability affects fewer women wage and salary earners than men in terms of absolute numbers. Second, the gender wage gap; women are concentrated in the lower end of the wage and salary spectrum. Prior to the tax reform, 97.8% of women were under the tax exemption threshold of JOD 12,000 versus 96.0% of men. Post-tax reform, 95.0% of women wage and salary earners continue to remain under the new tax exemption threshold of JOD 9,000 versus 91.6% of men. Hence it is of utmost importance that further revisions in taxation are undertaken (as itemized in the Executive Summary upfront) with the explicit objective of narrowing the gender employment and wage gap.

An important gender egalitarian aspect of the current PIT system is that it does not impose joint filing on married couples, but allows for individual filing. This is desirable from a gender equality perspective since joint filing systems expose secondary earners (usually women) to a higher marginal tax rate and hence pose a disincentive to their labor market activation. Nevertheless, under the revised tax law, joint filing remains as an option for married couples and it is likely to be consented by married women given their lack of financial literacy. This can be overcome through mandatory information dissemination by the tax authorities aimed at dual earner couples. As part of the gender analysis we compared the tax burden experienced by male breadwinner versus dual earner households versus female breadwinner households in the pre-reform versus the post-reform context both in terms of horizontal and vertical equity. As expected male breadwinner households (only husband employed, wife homemaker) is the norm; they constitute close to half of all households. Dual earner (both wife and husband employed) households make up less than 8% of all households; and female breadwinner households (single woman breadwinner with dependent children) make up less

than 1%. As much as one-fifth of all households do not have any members employed (with the main sources of income being pensions, social transfers or a small minority who have property or rent income). The distribution of households across these categories reflect the overall low levels of employment and very low female employment.

On the positive side, we find that post-reform, considering households with earnings above average and hence inside the tax net, the incentive for dual earner couples has become stronger, an effect that is instigated through the lowering of thresholds and the individual filing system. In addition, a gender discriminatory implementation against single female earner households has been eliminated through the new tax law where now female breadwinner status is explicitly recognized. At the same time, overall the progressiveness of PIT (vertical equity) has also been enhanced with higher income households being taxed at higher rates than pre-reform levels, while lower income households continue to remain tax-exempt. However, the exemption ceiling imposed on spouses (max. JOD 23,000) puts dual earner couples at a tax disadvantage vis-à-vis other types of multiple earner households such as father-and-son employed households, needs to be removed since it acts as a source of discrimination against dual earner couples. In addition, expenses on social care services, such as nurseries and domestic workers, can be included under tax exemption so as to encourage dual earner households.

An important concern regarding the progressiveness of the Jordanian tax system is the reliance on the revenue generation on indirect (sales) taxes rather than direct taxes. The general sales tax (GST) is regressive since it results in lower income households paying a larger share of sales taxes relative to their income than higher income households. The tax reform allows for a step in the right direction through an expansion of the PIT base and increasing taxation of higher income earners. The simultaneous increase in business taxes is likely to make an additional contribution to the increase in direct tax revenues, alleviating the dependence on the sales tax. Nevertheless, indirect taxation continues to constitute the bulk of tax revenues.

Our gender analysis of indirect taxation has confirmed that households with lower income

allocate a higher share of their income to consumption spending, as well as a higher share of their total expenditures to necessity consumption rather than luxury consumption than higher households with higher income. There are also gendered consumption patterns: Households, where women have access to independent income (dual earners, female breadwinners), allocate a higher share of their income to consumption spending, as well as a higher share of their total expenditures to necessity consumption (spending for household welfare such as food, education, health) rather than luxury consumption across all income quintiles. Hence the differentiated GST rates whereby necessity items are taxed higher (lower) are likely to produce negative (positive) gender redistributive outcomes given different spending patterns of women versus men; and also hurt (benefit) children's wellbeing. Any changes in sales taxation should be designed taking into account the consumption patterns, which vary by income and gender; and to ensure equality enhancing redistribution.

Beyond the tax reform, an important channel through which the gendered effects of recent macroeconomic and fiscal policy reforms prevail pertains to the constraints on fiscal spending. Given women's structural roles as primary care givers in the family, cuts in public spending and consequent deterioration in quantity and quality of health, education and social services increase their unpaid work burden, impose more binding constraints on their time and hence equal access to employment and earnings. Under the austerity measures in Jordan, public expenditures have experienced a sharp decline (by almost 10 percentage points in the past decade), including expenditures in public investment and social spending. Jordan does not have time-use data, hence it is not possible to explore the impact of austerity on women's unpaid work time. Nevertheless, our review of labor market patterns by gender, education and labor market status has shown that unpaid care work is one of the primary factors conditioning women's labor market activity rates. The comparison of women's average wages versus average childcare costs is testimony to the fact that the lack of access to affordable and quality childcare services when combined with low wages for women, acts as a major impediment to women's labor market attachment.

Our review of the policy discourse on women's employment shows that it is generally acknowledged that improving access to childcare and ensuring work-life balance in the labor market is a necessary intervention. However, as far as actual policy implementation is concerned, childcare solutions remain workplace focused, rather than public provisioning of services. A primary strategy suggested for work-life balance is 'flexible work for women'. Resolving the work-family balance constraints through the channeling of women to part-time and home-based 'female' jobs is highly problematic as it threatens to foster further gender jobs segregation and deepen economic gender wage and social security gaps under the pretense of narrowing the gender employment gap. Flexible work has the potential to be part of an equality enhancing solution if promoted on equal terms for both men and women as temporary flexible work opportunities over the life cycle.

There is an interconnection between the gendered impact of fiscal policy on the revenue side (taxation) and the spending side (public expenditures). More efficient and higher tax revenue collection (assuming that it is done on a progressive taxation principle) enables a higher potential of the state for equality enhancing public expenditures. Hence a true gender equality assessment of the Jordanian tax reform would not be complete without a gender analysis of fiscal spending patterns. Such an undertaking would complement the analysis presented in this report, which focused primarily on the tax revenue side. Overall a gender budgeting approach is essential at the national and local level to facilitate a gender egalitarian allocation of public resources.

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APPENDIX I: DATA SOURCES

The Department of Statistics of Jordan provides several statistical data through the official website and collects surveys to fulfill the diverse needs of data uses. Three different data set is employed in the present project in order to cover all the aspects of the subject comprehensively. These surveys are namely, Employment and Unemployment Survey 2018 (EUS)³⁸, Household's Expenditure and Income Survey 2013/2014 (HEIS)³⁹ and Jordanian Labor Market Panel Survey 2016 (JLMPS). All the surveys are carried out regularly in specific years. They follow a set of order to the compilation of the data. The surveys are obtained from Economic Research Forum (ERF) data portal.

Household's Expenditure and Income Survey is regularly conducted in specific years. The survey provides data reflecting households' and individuals' expenditures and incomes and the relationship between expenditure and income with various variables. In the present project, the survey of the year 2013 is utilized to obtain the necessary analysis. The survey is designed to serve some basic objectives. Therefore, the data set in the surveys are comprised of information collected regularly from different part of Jordan as to represent at sub-district level. The sample of the survey is designed as a two-stage cluster stratified sampling method. The survey questionnaire consists of three integrated questionnaires namely general questionnaire, expenditure on food items and recurring goods questionnaire and expenditure of non-food item questionnaire. In general questionnaire, the housing units' characteristics, the household members' characteristics and various income sources of the households, which includes household ownership of assets, household productive activities and current income sources, are covered. The questionnaire of expenditure on food items and recurring goods contained data of the expenditure on seventeen consumer groups. Besides, parts on the

production of goods for own consumption, in-kind food gifts to and from the related household, and expenditure (on food items) of servants residing with households on themselves from their own wages are also included in this questionnaire. The questionnaire of expenditure on non-food items consists of 11 expenditure groups on non-food items and five expenditure groups on services, in addition to a group of consumer expenditures that was not mentioned within the previous groups, and a group of non-consumer expenditures (transfers). Besides, parts on self-consumption, in-kind non-food gifts from and to the household, servants' non-food expenditures on themselves from their own wages are also available in this questionnaire. The micro data set consists of 25,845 individuals and out of them 12,991 is men and 12,854 are women. There exist 4850 households in the overall sample. 95% of individuals are Jordanians. (OAMDI, 2017. Harmonized Household Income and Expenditure Surveys (HHIES), <http://erf.org.eg/data-portal/>. Version 2.0 of Licensed Data Files; HEIS 2013 - Department of Statistics (DOS), The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Egypt: Economic Research Forum (ERF)).

Jordanian Labor Market Panel Surveys are designed as a panel survey, and therefore, the majority of the households and individuals who are interviewed at specific rounds are supposed to be same. The first round of the survey is conducted in the year 2010 and six years later, the second round is carried out. The survey is planned to follow an existing population over time, however, in order to capture the impact of the migrant to Jordan, a large refresher sample of 3,000 households added into the sample.

In that sense, this panel survey includes 2010 cross-section data, 2016 cross section data, 2010/2016 panel data and 2010/2016 repeated cross-section data. It allows making an estimate at the national level, for urban and rural areas, and for all regions. As the survey provides information about household and individual based, questionnaire divided into three different parts: household level questionnaire individual

38 In the present project, EUS of the year 2018 is utilized that is pen access to the public from Department of Statistics (DOS) of Jordan's website.

39 The most recent round of HEIS was conducted in 2017/2018, however, the micro data was not available from Department of Statistics (DOS) of Jordan.

level questionnaire and household enterprise and migration questionnaire. The household questionnaire consists of information about housing conditions, ownership of goods. the individual questionnaire includes personal information such as education, health, labor market status, fertility, women's status, wage earnings, savings and borrowing behavior, gender attitudes. the migration and household enterprise questionnaire consist of current migrants aboard, remittances, household non-farm enterprises information.

In the present project, cross-section data of the year 2016 is employed for the empirical analysis. The JLMPS 2016 sample is consists of 7,229 households in total, including 3,058 that were part of the original 2010 sample, 1,221 split households and 2,950 refresher households. The sample includes a total of 33,450 individuals and among them 16,908 is men and 16,542 are women. 85% of them are Jordanians. (OAMDI, 2018. Labor Market Panel Surveys (LMPS), <http://erf.org.eg/data-portal/>. Version 1.1 of Licensed Data Files; JLMPS 2016. Egypt: Economic Research Forum (ERF)).

Employment and Unemployment Survey is carried out by Department of Statistics by implementing Labor Force Survey through for round every year. The survey is based on the basis of scientific criteria in

designing the multistage cluster stratified samples. Therefore, the survey represents the Kingdom, governorates, three regions, urban/rural and Jordanians and non-Jordanians. In the survey, the characteristic of the employed and unemployed are provided. The questionnaire includes two different types which are household level and individual level questionnaires. The household level questionnaire includes geographical characteristic, household composition, ownership of goods and labor force classification of household members. The individual based questionnaire consists of information from personal information such as education, employment and unemployment characteristics, inactivity reasons, labor market status, wages and incomes. The survey includes 16,500 households from all governorates. For the present project, even the survey of 2016 is obtained from Economic Research Forum data portal, the survey of the more recent year of 2018, open access from Department of Statistics of Jordan, is utilized for the empirical results. (OAMDI, 2017. Harmonized Labor Force Surveys (HLFS), <http://erf.org.eg/data-portal/>. Version 1.0 of Licensed Data Files; EUS 2016 - Department of Statistics (DOS), The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Egypt: Economic Research Forum (ERF)).

APPENDIX II: LABOR MARKET PANEL SURVEY (LMPS) BY ECONOMIC RESEARCH COUNCIL (ERF) 2016

Appendix II.1. Women's access to income, mobility and attitudes

TABLE A. II.1.1:
Access to household money to use, by marital status

	Total	Single	Married	Divorced	Widow(er)
	1,949,830	712,064	1,146,597	38,416	52,753
Yes	377,978 (19.4%)	37,668 (5.3%)	295,561 (25.8%)	12,936 (33.7%)	31,813 (60.3%)
No	1,571,852 (80.6%)	674,396 (94.7%)	851,036 (74.2%)	25,480 (66.3%)	20,940 (39.7%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanian women ages 15-59.

TABLE A. II.1.2:
Savings or personal property, by marital status

	Total	Single	Married	Divorced	Widow(er)
	1,949,830	712,064	1,146,597	38,416	52,753
Yes	110,702 (5.7%)	15,424 (2.2%)	89,769 (7.9%)	2,035 (5.3%)	3,474 (6.6%)
No	1,839,128 (94.3%)	696,640 (97.8%)	1,056,828 (92.2%)	36,381 (94.7%)	49,279 (93.4%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanian women ages 15-59.

TABLE A. II.1.3:
Freedom of mobility: Permission to go local market, by marital status

	Total	Single	Married	Divorced	Widow(er)
	1,949,830	712,064	1,146,597	38,416	52,753
Go Alone Without Permission	110,690 (5.7%)	32,928 (4.6%)	39,253 (3.4%)	9,517 (24.8%)	28,992 (55.0%)
Go Alone, But Must Be Granted Permission	774,043 (39.7%)	222,934 (31.3%)	534,843 (46.7%)	10,767 (28.0%)	5,499 (10.4%)
Go Alone After Informing Family	159,790 (8.2%)	49,586 (7.0%)	98,469 (8.6%)	7,368 (19.2%)	4,367 (8.3%)
Cannot Go Alone	892,628 (45.8%)	397,331 (55.8%)	471,961 (41.2%)	9,721 (25.3%)	13,615 (25.8%)
Don't Know	4,044 (0.2%)	2,737 (0.4%)	574 (0.1%)	626 (1.6%)	107 (0.2%)
Not Applicable	8,635 (0.4%)	6,548 (0.9%)	1,497 (0.1%)	417 (1.1%)	173 (0.3%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanian women ages 15-59.

TABLE A. II.1.4:
Freedom of mobility: Permission to go to doctor, by marital status

	Total	Single	Married	Divorced	Widow(er)
	1,949,830	712,064	1,146,597	38,416	52,753
Go Alone Without Permission	102,576 (5.3%)	25,836 (3.6%)	37,433 (3.3%)	10,149 (26.4%)	29,158 (55.3%)
Go Alone, But Must Be Granted Permission	701,393 (36.0%)	203,370 (28.6%)	484,640 (42.3%)	9,092 (23.7%)	4,291 (8.1%)
Go Alone After Informing Family	152,795 (7.8%)	49,848 (7.0%)	90,373 (7.9%)	7,854 (20.4%)	4,720 (9.0%)
Cannot Go Alone	982,818 (50.4%)	425,497 (59.8%)	532,052 (46.4%)	10,965 (28.5%)	14,304 (27.1%)
Don't Know	745 (0.04%)	240 (0.03%)	323 (0.03%)	75 (0.2%)	107 (0.2%)
Not Applicable	9,503 (0.5%)	7,273 (1.0%)	1,776 (0.2)	281 (0.7%)	173 (0.3%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanian women ages 15-59.

TABLE A. II.1.5:
Freedom of mobility: Permission to take the child to doctor, by marital status

	Total	Single	Married	Divorced	Widow(er)
	1,949,830	712,064	1,146,597	38,416	52,753
Go Alone Without Permission	58,680 (3.0%)	9,609 (1.4%)	29,000 (2.5%)	5,662 (14.7%)	14,409 (27.3%)
Go Alone, But Must Be Granted Permission	489,486 (25.1%)	91,103 (12.8%)	389,149 (33.9%)	6,155 (16.0%)	3,079 (5.8%)
Go Alone After Informing Family	109,465 (5.6%)	22,748 (3.2%)	79,920 (7.0%)	5,475 (14.3%)	1,322 (2.5%)
Cannot Go Alone	718,022 (36.8%)	220,275 (30.9%)	479,374 (41.8%)	8,314 (21.6%)	10,059 (19.1%)
Don't Know	3,283 (0.2%)	2,353 (0.3%)	823 (0.1%)	---	107 (0.2%)
Not Applicable	570,894 (29.3%)	365,976 (51.4%)	168,331 (14.7%)	12,810 (33.4%)	23,777 (45.1%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanian women ages 15-59.

TABLE A. II.1.6:
Freedom of mobility: Permission to visit friends/family, by marital status

	Total	Single	Married	Divorced	Widow(er)
	1,949,830	712,064	1,146,597	38,416	52,753
Go Alone Without Permission	96,202 (4.9%)	21,666 (3.0%)	35,165 (3.1%)	10,784 (28.1%)	28,587 (54.2%)
Go Alone, But Must Be Granted Permission	734,523 (37.7%)	204,550 (28.7%)	517,642 (45.2%)	8,138 (21.2%)	4,193 (8.0%)
Go Alone After Informing Family	145,769 (7.5%)	45,526 (6.4%)	86,821 (7.6%)	7,732 (20.1%)	5,690 (10.8%)
Cannot Go Alone	935,224 (48.0%)	412,073 (57.9%)	498,245 (43.5%)	11,354 (29.6%)	13,552 (25.7%)
Don't Know	1,149 (0.1%)	318 (0.04%)	551 (0.1%)	---	280 (0.5%)
Not Applicable	36,963 (1.9%)	27,931 (3.9%)	8,173 (0.7%)	408 (1.1%)	451 (0.9%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanian women ages 15-59.

TABLE A. II.1.7:
Any family you could rely on to provide a place to stay at night, by marital status

	Total	Single	Married	Divorced	Widow(er)
	1,949,830	712,064	1,146,597	38,416	52,753
Yes	1,450,098 (74.4%)	509,426 (71.5%)	879,102 (76.7%)	27,209 (70.8%)	34,361 (65.1%)
No	498,427 (25.6%)	202,638 (28.5%)	267,495 (23.3%)	11,207 (29.2%)	18,392 (34.9%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanian women ages 15-59.

TABLE A. II.1.8:**Any family you could rely on to help out financially, by marital status**

	Total	Single	Married	Divorced	Widow(er)
	1,949,830	712,064	1,146,597	38,416	52,753
Yes	1,451,595 (74.5%)	510,374 (71.7%)	879,411 (76.7%)	27,449 (71.5%)	34,361 (65.1%)
No	498,235 (25.5%)	201,690 (28.3%)	267,186 (23.3%)	10,967 (28.5%)	18,392 (34.9%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanian women ages 15-59.

TABLE A. II.1.9:**Husband has right to hit/punish wife: if she burns the food, by marital status**

	Total	Single	Married	Divorced	Widow(er)
	1,949,830	712,064	1,146,597	38,416	52,753
Yes	80,303 (4.1%)	22,979 (3.2%)	53,532 (4.7%)	2,223 (5.8%)	1,569 (4.1%)
No	689,085 (95.9%)	1,093,065 (96.8%)	36,193 (95.3%)	51,184 (94.2%)	1,869,527 (97.0%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanian women ages 15-59.

TABLE A. II.1.10:**Husband has right to hit/punish wife: if she neglects her children, by marital status**

	Total	Single	Married	Divorced	Widow(er)
	1,949,830	712,064	1,146,597	38,416	52,753
Yes	159,042 (8.2%)	42,196 (5.9%)	111,815 (9.8%)	2,298 (6.0%)	2,733 (5.2%)
No	1,785,239 (91.6%)	666,585 (93.6%)	1,032,772 (90.1%)	35,942 (93.6%)	49,940 (94.7%)
Don't Know	5,549 (0.3%)	3,283 (0.5%)	2,010 (0.2%)	176 (0.5%)	80 (0.2%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanian women ages 15-59.

TABLE A. II.1.11:**Husband has right to hit/punish wife: if she argues with him, by marital status**

	Total	Single	Married	Divorced	Widow(er)
	1,949,830	712,064	1,146,597	38,416	52,753
Yes	160,986 (8.3%)	44,836 (6.3%)	109,556 (9.6%)	2,359 (6.1%)	4,235 (8.0%)
No	1,785,026 (91.6%)	664,136 (93.3%)	1,036,571 (90.4%)	35,881 (93.4%)	48,438 (91.6%)
Don't Know	3,818 (0.2%)	3,092 (0.3%)	470 (0.04%)	176 (0.5%)	80 (0.2%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanian women ages 15-59.

TABLE A. II.1.12:**Husband has right to hit/punish wife: if she talks to other men, by marital status**

	Total	Single	Married	Divorced	Widow(er)
	1,949,830	712,064	1,146,597	38,416	52,753
Yes	227,176 (11.7%)	60,639 (8.5%)	159,142 (13.9%)	3,060 (8.0%)	4,335 (8.2%)
No	1,717,638 (88.1%)	648,292 (91.0%)	985,828 (86.0%)	35,180 (91.6%)	48,338 (91.6%)
Don't Know	5,016 (0.3%)	3,133 (0.4%)	1,627 (0.1%)	176 (0.5%)	80 (0.2%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPs 2016 microdata, for Jordanian women ages 15-59.

TABLE A. II.1.13:**Husband has right to hit/punish wife: if she wastes his money, by marital status**

	Total	Single	Married	Divorced	Widow(er)
	1,949,830	712,064	1,146,597	38,416	52,753
Yes	159,295 (8.2%)	45,935 (6.5%)	108,303 (9.5%)	2,298 (6.0%)	2,759 (5.2%)
No	1,787,515 (91.7%)	663,541 (93.2%)	1,038,038 (90.5%)	35,942 (93.6%)	49,994 (94.8%)
Don't Know	3,020 (0.2%)	2,588 (0.4%)	256 (0.02%)	176 (0.5%)	---

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPs 2016 microdata, for Jordanian women ages 15-59.

TABLE A. II.1.14:**Husband has right to hit/punish wife: if she refuses sex, by marital status**

	Total	Single	Married	Divorced	Widow(er)
	1,949,830	712,064	1,146,597	38,416	52,753
Yes	163,460 (8.4%)	50,199 (7.1%)	108,453 (9.5%)	2,298 (6.0%)	2,510 (4.8%)
No	1,780,808 (91.3%)	658,083 (92.4%)	1,036,620 (90.4%)	35,942 (93.6%)	50,163 (95.1%)
Don't Know	5,562 (0.3%)	3,782 (0.5%)	1,524 (0.1%)	176 (0.5%)	80 (0.2%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPs 2016 microdata, for Jordanian women ages 15-59.

TABLE A. II.1.15:
Afraid of disagreeing with husband/brother/father, by marital status

	Total	Single	Married	Divorced	Widow(er)
	1,949,830	712,064	1,146,597	38,416	52,753
Yes	640,930 (32.9%)	223,222 (31.4%)	395,488 (34.5%)	11,928 (31.0%)	10,292 (32.9%)
No	1,308,900 (67.0%)	488,842 (68.6%)	751,109 (65.5%)	26,488 (69.0%)	42,461 (67.1%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanian women ages 15-59.

Appendix II.2. Women in Paid Employment

TABLE A. II.2.1:
Primary Use of Labor Income

Use of Labor Income	
Total	298,240
To help the family financially	213,336 (71.5%)
To meet own personal needs	81,624 (27.4%)
To save for marriage	2,934 (1.0%)
To save for future needs	51 (0.02%)
Don't Know	295 (0.1%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanian women ages 15-59 who are working or ever worked for wages.

TABLE A. II.2.2:
The share of income kept to oneself, by marital status

	Total	Single	Married	Divorced	Widow(er)
	298,240	90,776	187,759	11,100	8,605
None	139,402 (46.7%)	29,752 (32.8%)	100,410 (53.5%)	4,594 (41.4%)	4,646 (54.0%)
Less than 1/4	69,082 (23.2%)	21,074 (23.2%)	44,264 (23.6%)	1,849 (16.7%)	1,895 (22.0%)
1/4 to less than 1/2	46,721 (15.7%)	16,229 (17.9%)	28,806 (15.3%)	918 (8.3%)	768 (8.9%)
1/2 to less than 3/4	14,512 (4.9%)	8,273 (9.1%)	5,692 (3.0%)	197 (1.8%)	350 (4.1%)
3/4 to less than all	5,539 (1.9%)	3,988 (4.4%)	1,551 (0.8%)	---	---
All	20,989 (7.0%)	10,925 (12.0%)	5,601 (3.0%)	3,517 (31.7%)	946 (11.0%)
Don't Know	1,995 (0.7%)	535 (0.6%)	1,435 (0.8%)	25 (0.2%)	---

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanian women ages 15-59 who are working or ever worked for wages.

TABLE A. II.2.3:
The share of income saved, by marital status

	Total	Single	Married	Divorced	Widow(er)
	298,240	90,776	187,759	11,100	8,605
None	193,995 (65.1%)	49,785 (54.8%)	129,869 (69.2%)	6,970 (62.8%)	7,371 (85.7%)
Less than 1/4	55,076 (18.5%)	19,534 (21.5%)	33,216 (17.7%)	1,745 (15.7%)	581 (6.8%)
1/4 to less than 1/2	29,771 (10.0%)	11,898 (13.1%)	17,056 (9.1%)	742 (6.7%)	75 (0.9%)
1/2 to less than 3/4	7,317 (2.5%)	4,647 (5.1%)	2,478 (1.3%)	192 (1.7%)	---
3/4 to less than all	3,096 (1.0%)	2,770 (3.1%)	111 (0.06%)	215 (1.9%)	---
All	6,578 (2.2%)	1,532 (1.7%)	3,578 (1.9%)	890 (8.0%)	578 (6.7%)
Don't Know	2,407 (0.8%)	610 (0.7%)	1,451 (0.8%)	346 (3.1%)	---

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanian women ages 15-59 who are working or ever worked for wages.

TABLE A. II.2.4:
The primary means of saving, by marital status

	Total	Single	Married	Divorced	Widow(er)
	104,030	40,991	57,890	3,915	1,234
Bank/Financial Institution	41,642 (40.0%)	17,115 (41.8%)	22,420 (38.7%)	1,558 (39.8%)	549 (44.5%)
Participation in individual association	9,292 (8.9%)	5,419 (13.2%)	3,681 (6.4%)	192 (4.9%)	---
Bought gold/Jewelry	1,068 (1.0%)	222 (0.5%)	846 (1.5%)	---	---
Saving money at home	49,456 (47.5%)	17,479 (42.6%)	29,609 (51.2%)	1,819 (46.5%)	549 (44.5%)
Don't Know	2,572 (2.5%)	756 (1.8%)	1,334 (2.3%)	346 (8.8%)	136 (11.0%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanian women ages 15-59 who are working or ever worked for wages.

TABLE A. II.2.5:**Were you working for wages at the time of marriage?, by marital status**

	Total	Married	Divorced	Widow(er)
	207,464	187,759	11,100	8,605
Yes	120,253 (58.0%)	112,730 (60.0%)	3,758 (33.9%)	3,765 (43.8%)
No	87,186 (42.0%)	75,029 (40.0%)	7,317 (65.9%)	4,840 (56.3%)
Don't Know	25 (0.01%)	---	25 (0.2%)	---

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanian women ages 15-59 who are working or ever worked for wages.

TABLE A. II.2.6:**Were you working for wages during first pregnancy?, by marital status**

	Total	Married	Divorced	Widow(er)
	179,889	162,902	9,579	7,408
Yes	98,270 (54.6%)	92,193 (56.6%)	2,815 (29.4%)	3,262 (44.0%)
No	80,573 (44.8%)	69,663 (42.8%)	6,764 (70.6%)	4,146 (56.0%)
Don't Know	1,046 (0.6%)	1,046 (0.6%)	---	---

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanian women ages 15-59 who are working or ever worked for wages.

TABLE A. II.2.7:**Weeks of paid maternity leave for first pregnancy by marital status**

	Total	Married	Divorced	Widow(er)
	98,270	92,193	2,815	3,262
Did not get maternity	14,215 (14.5%)	14,081 (15.3%)	---	134 (4.1%)
From 2-6 Weeks	27,976 (28.5%)	24,374 (26.4%)	2,355 (83.6%)	1,247 (38.2%)
From 7-13 Weeks	44,686 (45.5%)	43,615 (47.3%)	460 (16.4%)	611 (18.7%)
From 14-17 Weeks	2,865 (2.9%)	2,792 (3.0%)	---	73 (2.2%)
More Than 18 Weeks	7,997 (8.1%)	6,936 (7.5%)	---	1,061 (32.5%)
Don't Know	531 (0.5%)	395 (0.4%)	---	136 (4.2%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanian women ages 15-59 who are working or ever worked for wages.

TABLE A. II.2.8:
Months of unpaid nursing leave for first pregnancy by marital status

	Total	Married	Divorced	Widow(er)
	98,270	92,193	2,815	3,262
Did not get nursing	48,598 (49.5%)	46,881 (50.9%)	548 (19.5%)	1,169 (35.8%)
Less than 3 months	20,922 (21.3%)	19,028 (20.6%)	1,364 (48.5%)	530 (16.3%)
3 Months	24,077 (24.5%)	21,747 (23.6%)	903 (32.1%)	1,427 (43.8%)
For 4-6 Months	418 (0.4%)	418 (0.4%)	---	---
From 7 Months to 1 year	148 (0.2%)	148 (0.2%)	---	---
From 1-2 years	315 (0.3%)	315 (0.3%)	---	---
Don't Know	3,792 (3.9%)	3,656 (4.0%)	---	136 (4.2%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanian women ages 15-59 who are working or ever worked for wages.

TABLE A. II.2.9:
Any children below 12 years old, by marital status

	Total	Married	Divorced	Widow(er)
	122,243	112,884	7,434	1,925
Yes	105,270 (86.1%)	100,814 (89.3%)	3,801 (51.1%)	655 (34.0%)
No	16,973 (13.9%)	12,070 (10.7%)	3,633 (48.9%)	1,270 (66.0%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanian women ages 15-59 who are working or ever worked for wages.

TABLE A. II.2.10:
Primary caregiver while at work, by marital status

	Total	Married	Divorced	Widow(er)
	105,270	100,814	3,801	655
Mother (Woman's mother)	23,597 (22.4%)	22,855 (22.7%)	593 (15.6%)	149 (22.8%)
Mother-in-Law	24,479 (23.2%)	23,424 (23.2%)	1,055 (27.8%)	---
Daughter	2,454 (2.3%)	2,454 (2.4%)	---	---
Sister	1,608 (1.5%)	1,510 (1.5%)	98 (2.6%)	---
Husband	5,390 (5.1%)	4,860 (4.8%)	530 (13.9%)	---
Other Relatives	4,399 (4.2%)	3,352 (3.3%)	681 (17.9%)	366 (55.9%)
Neighbors	1,088 (1.0%)	1,088 (1.1%)	---	---
Nanny	1,439 (1.4%)	1,439 (1.4%)	---	---
Nursery School	23,812 (22.7%)	23,737 (23.6%)	75 (2.0%)	---
In School	14,050 (13.4%)	13,415 (13.3%)	495 (13.0%)	140 (21.4%)
Other	2,762 (2.6%)	2,680 (2.7%)	82 (2.2%)	---
Don't Know	192 (0.2%)	---	192 (5.1%)	---

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanian women ages 15-59 who are working or ever worked for wages.

TABLE A. II.2.11:
Do you pay those who care for children while at work?, by marital status

	Total	Married	Divorced	Widow(er)
	105,270	100,814	3,801	655
Yes	25,761 (24.5%)	25,611 (25.4%)	150 (4.0%)	---
No	79,163 (75.2%)	75,049 (74.4%)	3,459 (91.0%)	655 (100.0%)
Don't Know	346 (0.3%)	154 (0.2%)	192 (5.0%)	---

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanian women ages 15-59 who are working or ever worked for wages.

TABLE A. II.2.12:
Receiving the wages from work directly, by marital status

	Total	Single	Married	Divorced	Widow(er)
	298,240	90,776	187,759	11,100	8,605
Yes	280,546	83,665 (92.2%)	178,646 (95.2%)	10,803 (97.3%)	7,432 (87.4%)
No	17,694	7,111 (7.8%)	9,113 (4.8%)	297 (2.7%)	1,173 (13.6%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanian women ages 15-59 who are working or ever worked for wages.

TABLE A. II.2.13
The amount paid for childcare last month, by marital status

	Total	Married	Divorced
Minimum	15	15	20
Median	40	40	510
Mean	307	305	510
Maximum	9998	9998	1000

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanian women ages 15-59 who are working or ever worked for wages.

TABLE A. II.2.14:
Willingness to continue work after getting married

Willingness of going back to work	
Total	90,776
Definitely	62,401 (68.7%)
No	11,880 (13.1%)
It Depends on Husband	9,458 (10.4%)
It Depends on Circumstances	5,167 (5.7%)
Do not want to get married	1,622 (1.8%)
Don't Know	248 (0.3%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanian women ages 15-59 who are working or ever worked for wages.

TABLE A. II.2.15:
Having any savings

	Total	Women	Men
	4,366,799	2,205,845	2,160,954
Yes	52,034 (1.2%)	34,561 (1.6%)	17,473 (0.8%)
No	4,314,765 (98.8%)	2,171,284 (98.4%)	2,143,481 (99.2%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanians aged 15 and over.

TABLE A. II.2.16:
Means of savings

	Total	Women	Men
	52,034	34,561	17,473
Bank	16,318 (31.4%)	7,106 (20.6%)	9,212 (52.7%)
In Cash	11,369 (21.9%)	6,406 (18.5%)	4,963 (28.4%)
Gold	18,217 (35.0%)	17,442 (50.5%)	775 (4.4%)
Jewelry	1,789 (3.4%)	1,714 (5.0%)	75 (0.4%)
Other (At home)	3,542 (6.8%)	1,893 (5.5%)	1,649 (9.4%)
Don't Know	799 (1.5%)	---	799 (4.6%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanians aged 15 and over.

TABLE A. II.2.17:
Applied for any formal loans during 12 months?

	Total	Women	Men
	4,366,799	2,205,845	2,160,954
Yes	140,762 (3.2%)	39,982 (1.8%)	100,780 (4.7%)
No	4,226,037 (96.8%)	2,165,863 (98.2%)	2,060,174 (95.3%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanians aged 15 and over.

TABLE A. II.2.18:
Successful in getting the loan?

	Total	Women	Men
	140,762	39,982	100,780
Yes	137,170 (97.5%)	39,531 (98.9%)	97,639 (96.9%)
No	1,628 (1.2%)	151 (0.4%)	1,477 (1.5%)
Application pending	1,964 (1.4%)	300 (0.8%)	1,664 (1.7%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanians aged 15 and over.

TABLE A. II.2.19:
The reason why unsuccessful in getting the loan?

	Total	Women	Men
	1,628	151	1,477
Insufficient collateral	400 (37.0%)	151 (100.0%)	289 (20.0%)
lack of connections (relations & networks)	1,058 (65.0%)	---	1,058 (71.6%)
Other (has other loans)	130 (8.0%)	---	130 (8.8%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanians aged 15 and over.

TABLE A. II.2.20:
Financial institution from where the loan was borrowed? (Primary source)

	Total	Women	Men
	140,762	39,982	100,780
Social security fund	30,600 (21.7%)	18,967 (47.4%)	11,633 (11.5%)
Bank	87,685 (62.3%)	15,354 (38.4%)	72,331 (71.8%)
NGO's/charitable organization	1,418 (1.0%)	461 (1.2%)	957 (1.0%)
Private Sector Companies	10,751 (7.6%)	3,705 (9.3%)	7,046 (7.0%)
Other*	9,948 (7.1%)	1,315 (3.3%)	8,633 (8.6%)
Don't Know	360 (0.3%)	180 (0.5%)	180 (0.2%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanians aged 15 and over, who borrow money
* agricultural loan, from work etc,

TABLE A. II.2.21:
The reason for trying to borrow (primary source)

	Total	Women	Men
	140,762	39,982	100,780
To Fund A Non-Farm Enterprise	4,032 (2.9%)	824 (2.1%)	3,208 (3.2%)
To Fund An Agricultural Enterprise/Project	1,104 (0.8%)	168 (0.3%)	936 (0.9%)
To Buy A Car	25,880 (18.4%)	5,962 (14.9%)	19,918 (19.8%)
For Marriage	11,992 (8.5%)	1,886 (4.7%)	10,106 (10.0%)
Education	6,435 (4.6%)	2,515 (6.3%)	3,920 (3.9%)
To Buy A House	20,540 (14.6%)	4,975 (12.4%)	15,565 (15.4%)
A Medical Emergency	2,772 (2.0%)	1,800 (4.5%)	972 (1.0%)
Loss Of Job	232 (0.2%)	151 (0.4%)	81 (0.1%)
Other*	64,209 (45.6%)	19,958 (49.9%)	44,251 (43.9%)
Don't Know	3,566 (2.5%)	1,743 (4.4%)	1,823 (1.8%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanians aged 15 and over, who borrow money
* build a house for him/herself, family; debt payment; family expenses

TABLE A. II.2.22:
The amount of borrowing from primary source

	Total	Women	Men
	140,762	39,982	100,780
0-1000	44,629 (31.7%)	20,379 (51.0%)	24,250 (24.1%)
1001-2500	23,922 (17.0%)	7,867 (19.7%)	16,055 (15.9%)
2501-5000	23,739 (16.9%)	4,193 (10.5%)	19,546 (19.4%)
5001-7500	17,412 (12.4%)	1,902 (4.8%)	15,510 (15.4%)
7501-9000	8,588 (6.1%)	1,232 (3.1%)	7,356 (7.3%)
>9000	13,896 (9.9%)	3,340 (8.4%)	10,556 (10.5%)
No answer	8,576 (6.1%)	1,069 (2.7%)	7,507 (7.4%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanians aged 15 and over.

TABLE A. II.2.23:
The fees/interest on loan (primary source)

	Total	Women	Men
	137,170	39,531	97,639
Interest	96,243 (70.2%)	30,178 (76.3%)	66,065 (67.7%)
Fees	2,808 (2.1%)	---	2,808 (2.9%)
Interests and Fees	27,212 (19.8%)	6,380 (16.1%)	20,832 (21.3%)
None	10,832 (7.9%)	2,973 (7.5%)	7,859 (8.1%)
Don't Know	75 (0.1%)	---	75 (0.1%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanians aged 15 and over, who borrow money.

TABLE A. II.2.24:
Borrow money from any informal sources (individuals)

	Total	Women	Men
	4,366,799	2,205,845	2,160,954
Yes	64,020 (1.5%)	15,886 (0.7%)	48,134 (2.2%)
No	4,288,363 (98.2%)	2,182,298 (98.9%)	2,106,065 (97.5%)
Don't Know	14,416 (0.3%)	7,661 (0.4%)	6,755 (0.3%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanians aged 15 and over.

TABLE A. II.2.25:
The person that is borrowed from

	Total	Women	Men
	64,020	15,886	48,134
Family member	18,901 (29.5%)	6,435 (40.5%)	12,466 (25.9%)
Relatives	24,538 (28.3%)	4,560 (28.7%)	19,978 (41.5%)
3, Friends	16,548 (25.9%)	3,600 (22.6%)	12,948 (26.9%)
Neighbors	2,228 (3.5%)	997 (6.3%)	1,231 (2.6%)
Local money lenders	1,117 (1.7%)	---	1,117 (2.3%)
Other	394 (0.6%)	---	394 (0.8%)
Don't know	294 (0.5%)	294 (1.9%)	---

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanians aged 15 and over, who borrow money from any informal source.

TABLE A. II.2.26:
The reason of trying to borrow from each of these individuals

	Total	Women	Men
	64,020	15,886	48,134
To Fund A Non-Farm Enterprise	1,885 (2.9%)	372 (2.3%)	1,513 (3.1%)
To Fund An Agricultural Enterprise/Project	570 (0.9%)	---	570 (1.2%)
To Buy A Car	2,394 (3.7%)	---	2,394 (5.0%)
For Marriage	4,758 (7.4%)	297 (1.9%)	4,461 (9.3%)
Education	5,024 (7.9%)	1,726 (10.9%)	3,298 (6.9%)
To Buy A House	3,864 (6.0%)	1,351 (8.5%)	2,513 (5.2%)
A Medical Emergency	6,556 (10.2%)	2,975 (18.7%)	3,581 (7.4%)
Loss Of Job	1,743 (2.7%)	---	1,743 (3.6%)
Other*	37,016 (57.8%)	9,165 (57.7%)	27,851 (57.9%)
Don't Know	210 (0.3%)	---	210 (0.4%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanians aged 15 and over, who borrow money from any informal sources.
*house expenses, household needs, repayment of debts

TABLE A. II.2.27:
The amount of borrowing from informal source (individuals)

	Total	Women	Men
	64,020	15,886	48,134
0-1000	42,535 (66.2%)	13,722 (86.4%)	28,813 (59.6%)
1001-2500	9,777 (15.2%)	1,128 (7.1%)	8,649 (17.9%)
2501-5000	6,053 (9.4%)	95 (0.6%)	5,958 (12.3%)
5001-7500	1,773 (2.8%)	---	1,773 (3.7%)
7501-9000	2,023 (3.2%)	678 (4.3%)	1,345 (2.8%)
>9000	2,059 (3.2%)	263 (1.7%)	1,796 (3.7%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanians aged 15 and over, who borrow money from any informal sources.

TABLE A. II.2.28:
The fees/interest on loan (Informal Source)

	Total	Women	Men
	64,020	15,886	48,134
Interest	1,168 (1.8%)	---	1,168 (2.4%)
Fees	177 (0.3%)	---	177 (0.4%)
Interests and Fees	123 (0.2%)	---	123 (0.3%)
None	62,418 (97.5%)	15,886 (100.0)	46,532 (96.7%)
Don't Know	134 (0.2%)	---	134 (0.3%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanians aged 15 and over, who borrow money from any informal sources.

Appendix II.3. Women's and Men's Attitudes towards Paid Employment and Social Position, by Household Types

TABLE A. II. 3.1:
A woman's place is not only in the household, but she should also be allowed to work

	Total	Household Employment Categories Composition						
		Dual Earner	Male Breadwinner		Female Breadwinner		No One Employed	Others
			Married	Not Married	Married	Not Married		
	1,416,214 (100.0%)	102,376 (7.2%)	656,800 (46.4%)	14,358 (1.0%)	1,662 (0.1%)	9,124 (0.6%)	422,275 (29.8%)	209,719 (14.8%)
Strongly disagree	58,510 (4.1%)	540 (0.5%)	40,473 (6.2%)	488 (3.4%)	---	---	9,870 (2.3%)	7,139 (3.4%)
Disagree	159,433 (11.3%)	1,870 (2.0%)	99,536 (15.0%)	758 (5.0%)	128 (7.7%)	131 (1.0%)	38,957 (9.0%)	18,053 (9.0%)
Neither agree nor disagree	156,546 (11.1%)	5,375 (5.3%)	63,854 (9.7%)	1,212 (8.5%)	195 (11.7%)	2,080 (22.8%)	67,585 (16.0%)	16,245 (7.8%)
Agree	753,503 (53.2%)	68,346 (66.8%)	325,604 (49.6%)	7,218 (50.6%)	1,044 (62.8%)	4,535 (49.7%)	225,568 (53.4%)	121,188 (57.8%)
Strongly agree	288,035 (20.3%)	26,245 (25.6%)	127,333 (19.4%)	4,582 (32.1%)	295 (17.8%)	2,378 (26.1%)	80,295 (19.0%)	46,907 (22.4%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanians aged 15 and over.

TABLE A. II. 3.2:
The husband should help his working wife raise their children

	Total	Household Employment Categories Composition						No One Employed	Others
		Dual Earner	Male Breadwinner		Female Breadwinner				
			Married	Not Married	Married	Not Married			
	1,416,214 (100.0%)	102,376 (7.2%)	656,800 (46.4%)	14,358 (1.0%)	1,662 (0.1%)	9,124 (0.6%)	422,275 (29.8%)	209,719 (14.8%)	
Strongly disagree	77,637 (5.5%)	1,683 (1.6%)	52,486 (8.0%)	849 (6.0%)	---	1,258 (13.8%)	14,785 (3.5%)	6,576 (3.1%)	
Disagree	187,799 (13.3%)	5,640 (5.5%)	98,483 (15.0%)	816 (5.7%)	---	816 (8.9%)	54,536 (12.9%)	27,508 (13.1%)	
Neither agree nor disagree	156,398 (11.0%)	7,638 (7.5%)	65,916 (10.0%)	1,227 (8.6%)	128 (7.7%)	2,031 (22.3%)	61,892 (14.7%)	17,566 (8.4%)	
Agree	746,829 (52.7%)	65,345 (63.8%)	333,983 (50.9%)	7,143 (50.1%)	1,307 (78.6%)	3,690 (40.4%)	219,924 (52.1%)	115,437 (55.1%)	
Strongly agree	247,364 (17.5%)	22,070 (21.6%)	105,932 (16.1%)	4,223 (29.6%)	227 (13.7%)	1,329 (14.6%)	71,138 (16.9%)	42,445 (20.3%)	

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanians aged 15 and over.

TABLE A. II. 3.3:
The husband should help his working wife with household chores

	Total	Household Employment Categories Composition						No One Employed	Others
		Dual Earner	Male Breadwinner		Female Breadwinner				
			Married	Not Married	Married	Not Married			
	1,416,214 (100.0%)	102,376 (7.2%)	656,800 (46.4%)	14,358 (1.0%)	1,662 (0.1%)	9,124 (0.6%)	422,275 (29.8%)	209,719 (14.8%)	
Strongly disagree	89,125 (6.3%)	2,029 (2.0%)	58,244 (8.9%)	1,175 (8.2%)	---	1,258 (13.8%)	17,345 (4.1%)	9,074 (4.3%)	
Disagree	173,912 (12.3%)	9,255 (9.0%)	101,953 (15.5%)	366 (2.6%)	---	678 (7.4%)	42,525 (10.1%)	19,135 (9.1%)	
Neither agree nor disagree	170,674 (12.1%)	7,383 (7.2%)	73,387 (11.2%)	2,536 (17.8%)	128 (7.7%)	2,005 (22.0%)	65,169 (15.4%)	20,066 (9.6%)	
Agree	725,223 (51.2%)	63,183 (61.7%)	313,969 (47.8%)	6,292 (44.1%)	1,083 (65.2%)	3,788 (41.5%)	219,118 (51.9%)	117,790 (56.2%)	
Strongly agree	257,093 (18.2%)	20,526 (20.1%)	109,247 (16.6%)	3,889 (27.3%)	451 (27.1%)	1,395 (15.3%)	78,118 (18.5%)	43,467 (20.7%)	

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanians aged 15 and over.

TABLE A. II. 3.4:
Girls should go to school to prepare for jobs, not just to make them good mothers and housewives

	Total	Household Employment Categories Composition						
		Dual Earner	Male Breadwinner		Female Breadwinner		No One Employed	Others
			Married	Not Married	Married	Not Married		
	1,416,214 (100.0%)	102,376 (7.2%)	656,800 (46.4%)	14,358 (1.0%)	1,662 (0.1%)	9,124 (0.6%)	422,275 (29.8%)	209,719 (14.8%)
Strongly disagree	52,499 (3.7%)	967,0 (0.9%)	34,923 (5.3%)	1,138 (8.0%)	---	75 (0.8%)	9,496 (2.3%)	5,900 (2.8%)
Disagree	235,846 (16.7%)	9,494 (9.3%)	119,056 (18.1%)	1,248 (8.8%)	--	26 (0.3%)	69,952 (16.6%)	36,070 (17.2%)
Neither agree nor disagree	232,180 (16.4%)	10,723 (10.5%)	101,815 (15.5%)	2,465 (17.3%)	189 (11.4%)	2,446 (26.8%)	87,285 (20.7%)	27,257 (13.0%)
Agree	672,141 (47.5%)	59,730 (58.3%)	300,933 (45.8%)	6,812 (7.8%)	1,049 (63.1%)	4,512 (49.5%)	197,535 (46.8%)	101,570 (48.5%)
Strongly agree	223,361 (15.8%)	21,462 (21.0%)	100,073 (15.2%)	2,595 (18.2%)	424 (25.5%)	2,065 (22.6%)	58,007 (13.7%)	38,735 (18.5%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPs 2016 microdata, for Jordanians aged 15 and over.

TABLE A. II. 3.5:
A woman who works outside the home cannot be a good mother

	Total	Household Employment Categories Composition						
		Dual Earner	Male Breadwinner		Female Breadwinner		No One Employed	Others
			Married	Not Married	Married	Not Married		
	1,416,214 (100.0%)	102,376 (7.2%)	656,800 (46.4%)	14,358 (1.0%)	1,662 (0.1%)	9,124 (0.6%)	422,275 (29.8%)	209,719 (14.8%)
Strongly disagree	122,241 (8.6%)	10754 (10.5%)	55,036 (8.4%)	1,890 (13.3%)	---	996 (10.9%)	32,905 (7.8%)	20,660 (9.9%)
Disagree	692,221 (48.9%)	64179 (62.7%)	310,380 (47.3%)	8,333 (58.4%)	1,278 (76.9%)	3,641 (39.9%)	192,869 (45.7%)	111,541 (53.2%)
Neither agree nor disagree	264,385 (18.7%)	11,537 (11.3%)	119,958 (18.3%)	2,049 (14.4%)	189 (11.4%)	2,745 (30.1%)	96,910 (23.0%)	30,997 (14.8%)
Agree	258,177 (18.2%)	11,603 (11.3%)	133,791 (20.4%)	1,827 (12.8%)	195 (11.7%)	1,644 (18.0%)	74,416 (17.6%)	34,701 (16.6%)
Strongly agree	79,003 (5.6%)	4,303 (4.2%)	37,635 (5.7%)	159 (1.1%)	---	98 (1.1%)	25,175 (6.0%)	11,633 (5.6%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPs 2016 microdata, for Jordanians aged 15 and over.

TABLE A. II. 3.6:
For a woman's financial autonomy, she must work and have earnings

	Total	Household Employment Categories Composition						
		Dual Earner	Male Breadwinner		Female Breadwinner		No One Employed	Others
			Married	Not Married	Married	Not Married		
	1,416,214 (100.0%)	102,376 (7.2%)	656,800 (46.4%)	14,358 (1.0%)	1,662 (0.1%)	9,124 (0.6%)	422,275 (29.8%)	209,719 (14.8%)
Strongly disagree	29,194 (2.1%)	1,306 (1.3%)	19,429 (3.0%)	345 (2.4%)	---	---	6,509 (1.5%)	1,605 (0.8%)
Disagree	200,068 (14.1%)	7,931 (7.8%)	116,896 (17.8%)	1,370 (9.6%)	173 (10.4%)	107 (1.2%)	47,625 (11.3%)	25,966 (12.4%)
Neither agree nor disagree	276,656 (19.5%)	14,851 (14.5%)	125,544 (19.1%)	1,919 (13.5%)	---	2,673 (29.3%)	97,829 (23.2%)	33,840 (16.2%)
Agree	634,740 (44.8%)	55,501 (54.2%)	273,183 (41.6%)	5,647 (39.6%)	1,144 (68.8%)	4,273 (46.8%)	94,208 (46.0%)	100,784 (48.1%)
Strongly agree	275,369 (19.5%)	22,787 (22.3%)	121,748 (18.5%)	4,977 (34.9%)	345 (20.8%)	2,071 (22.7%)	76,104 (18.0%)	47,337 (22.6%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanians aged 15 and over.

TABLE A. II. 3.7:
A woman's work interferes with her ability to keep a good relationship with her husband

	Total	Household Employment Categories Composition						
		Dual Earner	Male Breadwinner		Female Breadwinner		No One Employed	Others
			Married	Not Married	Married	Not Married		
	1,416,214 (100.0%)	102,376 (7.2%)	656,800 (46.4%)	14,358 (1.0%)	1,662 (0.1%)	9,124 (0.6%)	422,275 (29.8%)	209,719 (14.8%)
Strongly disagree	106,598 (7.5%)	8,768 (8.6%)	45,785 (7.0%)	2,135 (15.0%)	---	577 (6.3%)	27,209 (6.4%)	22,124 (10.6%)
Disagree	629,017 (44.4%)	61,343 (59.9%)	277,152 (42.2%)	6,661 (46.7%)	1,357 (81.7%)	3,817 (41.8%)	179,012 (42.4%)	99,675 (47.6%)
Neither agree nor disagree	253,762 (17.9%)	13,443 (13.1%)	111,680 (17.0%)	3,156 (22.1%)	305 (18.4%)	2,988 (32.8%)	92,274 (21.9%)	29,916 (14.3%)
Agree	322,991 (22.8%)	13,771 (13.5%)	165,791 (25.2%)	1,493 (10.5%)	---	1,644 (18.0%)	96,167 (22.8%)	44,125 (21.1%)
Strongly agree	103,659 (7.3%)	5,051 (4.9%)	56,392 (8.6%)	813 (5.7%)	----	98 (1.1%)	27,613 (6.5%)	13,692 (6.5%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanians aged 15 and over.

TABLE A. II. 3.8:
Women should continue to obtain leadership positions in society

	Total	Household Employment Categories Composition						
		Dual Earner	Male Breadwinner		Female Breadwinner		No One Employed	Others
			Married	Not Married	Married	Not Married		
	1,416,214 (100.0%)	102,376 (7.2%)	656,800 (46.4%)	14,358 (1.0%)	1,662 (0.1%)	9,124 (0.6%)	422,275 (29.8%)	209,719 (14.8%)
Strongly disagree	37,772 (2.7%)	1,067 (1.0%)	23,418 (3.6%)	1,555 (10.9%)	---	---	8,950 (2.1%)	2,782 (1.3%)
Disagree	178,658 (12.6%)	8,394 (8.2%)	112,032 (17.1%)	546 (3.8%)	---	345 (3.8%)	39,764 (9.4%)	17,577 (8.4%)
Neither agree nor disagree	236,687 (16.7%)	11,515 (11.3%)	102,576 (15.6%)	1,483 (10.4%)	173 (10.4%)	2,005 (22.0%)	87,958 (20.8%)	30,977 (14.8%)
Agree	629,910 (44.5%)	54,768 (53.5%)	273,880 (41.7%)	5,414 (38.0%)	1,131 (68.1%)	4,173 (45.7%)	187,078 (44.3%)	103,466 (49.4%)
Strongly agree	333,000 (23.5%)	26,632 (26.0%)	144,894 (22.1%)	5,260 (36.9%)	358 (21.5%)	2,601 (28.5%)	98,525 (23.3%)	54,730 (26.1%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPs 2016 microdata, for Jordanians aged 15 and over.

TABLE A. II. 3.9:
Boys and girls should get the same amount of schooling

	Total	Household Employment Categories Composition						
		Dual Earner	Male Breadwinner		Female Breadwinner		No One Employed	Others
			Married	Not Married	Married	Not Married		
	1,416,214 (100%)	102,376 (7.2%)	656,800 (46.4%)	14,358 (1.0%)	1,662 (0.1%)	9,124 (0.6%)	422,275 (29.8%)	209,719 (14.8%)
Strongly disagree	9,394 (0.7%)	114 (0.1%)	4,968 (0.8%)	345 (2.4%)	---	---	3,114 (0.7%)	853 (0.4%)
Disagree	28,901 (2.0%)	665 (0.7%)	18,328 (2.8%)	26 (0.2%)	---	---	6,049 (1.4%)	3,833 (1.8%)
Neither agree nor disagree	107,736 (7.6%)	5,875 (5.7%)	42,470 (6.5%)	833 (5.8%)	---	2,005 (22.0%)	45,790 (10.8%)	10,763 (5.1%)
Agree	790,647 (55.8%)	54,566 (53.3%)	369,360 (56.2%)	6,772 (47.5%)	1,036 (62.3%)	4,045 (44.3%)	231,763 (54.9%)	123,105 (58.8%)
Strongly agree	479,349 (33.9%)	41,156 (40.2%)	221,674 (33.8%)	6,282 (44.1%)	626 (37.7%)	3,074 (33.7%)	135,559 (32.1%)	70,978 (33.9%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPs 2016 microdata, for Jordanians aged 15 and over.

TABLE A. II. 3.10:
Boys and girls should be treated equally

	Total	Household Employment Categories Composition						
		Dual Earner	Male Breadwinner		Female Breadwinner		No One Employed	Others
			Married	Not Married	Married	Not Married		
	1,416,214 (100.0%)	102,376 (7.2%)	656,800 (46.4%)	14,358 (1.0%)	1,662 (0.1%)	9,124 (0.6%)	422,275 (29.8%)	209,719 (14.8%)
Strongly disagree	4,556 (0.3%)	---	2,722 (0.4%)	---	---	---	1,552 (0.4%)	280 (0.1%)
Disagree	14,538 (1.0%)	183 (0.2%)	9,241 (1.4%)	345 (2.4%)	---	---	3,886 (0.6%)	883 (0.4%)
Neither agree nor disagree	101,172 (7.1%)	4,179 (4.1%)	35,565 (5.4%)	833 (5.8%)	---	1,136 (12.5%)	48,389 (11.5%)	11,070 (5.3%)
Agree	720,705 (50.9%)	54,549 (53.3%)	322,425 (49.1%)	6,245 (43.8%)	1,022 (61.5%)	5,135 (56.3%)	215,291 (51.0%)	116,038 (55.4%)
Strongly agree	575,056 (40.6%)	43,463 (42.5%)	286,847 (43.7%)	6,835 (47.9%)	640 (38.5%)	2,853 (31.3%)	153,157 (36.3%)	81,261 (38.8%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanians aged 15 and over.

Appendix II. 4.1. Experiences of and Attitudes towards Employment

TABLE A. 4.1.1:
Willingness to go back to work

Willingness	
Total	77,274
Definitely	64,292 (83.2%)
No	3,676 (4.8%)
It Depends on Circumstances	8,592 (11.1%)
Don't Know	741 (0.9%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanian single women ages 15-59, who are working or ever worked for wages

TABLE A. 4.1.2:
Occupation of Primary Job for Women*

Occupation –Total	
Legislators, Senior Officials & Managers	2,902 (1.3%)
Professionals	135,483 (60.9%)
Technicians and associate Professionals	23,285 (10.5%)
Clerical Support workers	15,938 (7.2%)
Service and sales Workers	18,559 (8.3%)
Skilled Agricultural, forestry and fishery workers	3,073 (1.4%)
Craft and related trades workers	8,197 (3.7%)
Plant and machine operators, and assemblers	621 (0.3%)
Elementary Occupations	14,394 (6.5%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanian women aged 15 and over, who worked during the past three months

*Among 224,970 women, 222,452 of them answer the question for occupation type.

TABLE A. 4.1.3:
Husband's opinion of women's employment

Total	187,759
Strongly Supportive	91,276 (48.6%)
Supportive	77,823 (41.5%)
No opinion	4,471 (2.4%)
Not supportive	11,166 (6.0%)
Do not know	171 (0.09%)
Not Applicable (No husband)	2,852 (1.5%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for married Jordanian women, aged 15-59, who are working or ever worked for wages

TABLE A. 4.1.4:
The reasons for deciding to stop working for wage (Primary Reason)

Reasons for job leave		Total
		83,082
Family Member Refused		21.0%
No Suitable Jobs		8.8%
No Suitable Wage		6.4%
No Jobs Available At All		6.5%
Don't Want To Work		20.5%
To Take Care Of Family (Children/Father)		13.0%
Other		23.8%
- Retirement		15.2%
- Moved/Migrated		0.8%
- Injury/Illness		1.8%
- Because Of The Administrator		0.1%
- Began To Work With A Wage		0.1%
- Complete The Study		0.2%
- Far Distance From Work		0.1%
- Has Income		0.2%
- Contract/Termination		1.3%
- Other		4.0%

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanian women ages 15-59, who currently non-employed but have past work experience.

TABLE A. 4.1.5:
Willingness to go back to work one day

Willingness of going back to work	
Total	83,082
Definitely	19.6%
If There is a Financial Need	7.9%
It Depends on Circumstances	4.8%
It Depends on Available Jobs	1.9%
No	62.6%
Don't Know	2.9%
Other Reasons	0.7%

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanian women ages 15-59, who currently non-employed but have past work experience.

TABLE A. 4.1.6:
Distribution of women who are not willing to go back to work one day by marital status and education level

Willingness of going back to work	
Total	51,091
Married-High School and Above	23,776 (46.5%)
Married-Under High School	15,561 (30.5%)
Single-High School and Above	4,127 (8.1%)
Single-Under High School	2,486 (4.9%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanian women ages 15-59, who currently non-employed but have past work experience.

TABLE A. 4.1.7:
Past paid work experience of women who are currently non-employed

Willingness of going back to work	
Total	1,708,984
Yes	82,088 (4.8%)
No	1,626,896 (95.2%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanian women ages 15-59.

TABLE A. 4. 1. 8:
The opinions of single women on paid work and marriageability

Influence of work on marriageability	78,896
Strengthens marriage	48,605 (61.6%)
Prevents marriage	1,014 (1.3%)
Has no influence	28,568 (36.2%)
Don't know	709 (0.9%)

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanian women ages 15-59.

TABLE A. 4. 1. 9:
The opinions of the women whether they continue employment after getting married or not for different age groups

	Total	Yes	No	it depends on husband's approval	it depends on circumstances	don't want to get married	Don't Know
Young (15-19)	2,103	71.0%	---	23.4%	5.6%	---	---
Younger (20-29)	44,216	64.4%	19.8%	10.7%	4.6%	---	0.3%
Prime working age group 1 (30-39)	25,836	78.2%	7.7%	11.8%	1.8%	0.4%	0.2%
Prime working age group 2 (40-49)	13,106	72.0%	7.1%	5.8%	10.2%	4.4%	0.5%
Late working age (50-59)	4,965	46.3%	4.1%	7.8%	23.3%	18.5%	---
Older (60+)		---	---	---	---	---	---
Total	90,226	62,401	11,930	9,098	5,167	1,622	248

Source: Authors' calculations based on JLMPS 2016 microdata, for Jordanian women ages 15-59, who currently non-employed but have past work experience.

APPENDIX III: PERSONAL INCOME TAX CALCULATIONS FOR DIFFERENT TYPES OF HOUSEHOLDS

TABLE A. III.1:
Personal Income Tax Calculations for Taxation Higher Income 20,000 JOD.

Post-Tax Reform	Male Breadwinner, Dependent Spouse, 2 children	Dual Breadwinner, 2 children, Equal Wages		Dual Breadwinner, 2 children, M>F		Single Mother Breadwinner, 2 Children	Single Father Breadwinner, 2 Children
		Male	Female	Male	Female		
Yearly gross income (2020)	20,000	10,000	10,000	12,500	7,500	20,000	20,000
Less:							
Personal exemption*	9,000	9,000	9,000	9,000	9,000	9,000	9,000
dependents	9,000	0	0	0	0	9,000	9,000
Against certain expenses** (1000 for indiv, 1000 for spouse, 1000 for each child up to 3000 max)	2,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
Child 1	1,000	1,000		1,000		1,000	1,000
Child 2	1,000		1,000	1,000		1,000	1,000
Child 3							
Total Tax Exemptions	22,000	11,000	11,000	12,000	9,000	21,000	21,000
Yearly taxable income	-2,000	-1,000	-1,000	500	-1,500	-1,000	-1,000
The first JOD 5,000 is subject to PIT at 5%	0	0	0	25	0	25	
The second JOD 5,000 is subject to PIT at 10%	0						
The second JOD 5,000 is subject to PIT at 15%							

TABLE A. III.2:
Personal Income Tax Calculations for Taxation Higher Income 40,000 JOD

Post-Tax Reform	Male Breadwinner, Dependent Spouse, 2 children	Dual Breadwinner, 2 children, Equal Wages		Dual Breadwinner, 2 children, M>F		Male Breadwinner w/ dependent spouse + 2nd earner son/daughter + 1 child		Single Mother Breadwinner, 2 Children	Single Father Breadwinner, 2 Children	son/daughter	Total	
		Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Male					Female
Yearly gross income (2020)	40,000	20,000	20,000	40,000	40,000	25,000	15,000	40,000	40,000	10,000	40,000	40,000
Less:												
Personal exemption*	9,000	9,000	9,000	18,000	18,000	9,000	9,000	18,000	9,000	9,000	18,000	9,000
Dependents	9,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9,000	0	9,000	9,000
Against certain expenses** (1,000 for indiv, 1,000 for spouse, 1,000 for each child up to 3,000 max)	2,000	1,000	1,000	2,000	2,000	1,000	1,000	3,000	1,000	1,000	3,000	1,000
Child 1	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	0	1,000	1,000
Child 2	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	0	1,000	1,000
Child 3												
Total Tax Exemptions	22,000	11,000	11,000	22,000	22,000	12,000	10,000	31,000	21,000	10,000	31,000	21,000
Yearly taxable income	18,000	9,000	9,000	18,000	18,000	13,000	5,000	9,000	19,000	0	9,000	19,000
The first JOD 5,000 is subject to PIT at 5%	250	250	250	5,000	5,000	650	500	250	250	0	250	250
The second JOD 5,000 is subject to PIT at 10%	500	400	400	4,000	4,000	800	800	400	400	0	400	400
The second JOD 5,000 is subject to PIT at 15%	750			9,000	9,000			0	750	0	0	750
The second JOD 5,000 is subject to PIT at 20%	600							0	800	0	0	800
The remaining balance of the yearly taxable income (JOD 9,000) is subject to PIT at 25%								0	19,000	0	0	19,000
Total PIT	2,100	650	650	1,300	1,300	1,450	500	1,950	2,300	0	650	2,300

Net Income	37900	19,350	19,350	38,700	23,550	14,500	38,050	29,350	10,000	39,350	37700	37700
Tax share of net income	0.06	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.062	0.034	0.051	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.06	0.06
Tax share of gross income	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.058	0.033	0.049	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.06	0.06
Pre-Tax Reform	Male Breadwinner, Dependent Spouse, 2 children	Dual Breadwinner, 2 children, Equal Wages			Dual Breadwinner, 2 children, M>F			Male Breadwinner w/ dependent spouse + 2nd earner son/daughter +1 child			Single Mother Breadwinner, 2 Children	Single Father Breadwinner, 2 Children
		Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	son/daughter	Total		
Yearly gross income (2018)	40,000	20,000	20,000	40,000	25,000	15,000	40,000	30,000	10,000	40,000	40,000	40,000
Less:												
Personal exemption*	12,000	12,000	12,000	24,000	12,000	12,000		12,000	12,000		12,000	12,000
Dependents	12,000	0	0	0	0	0		12,000	0		12,000	12,000
Against certain expenses**	2,000	1,000	1,000	2,000	1,000	1,000		2,000	1,000		1,000	1,000
Child 1	1,000	1,000		1,000	1,000			1,000			1,000	1,000
Child 2	1,000		1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000			1,000	1,000
Child 3												
Total Tax Exemptions	28,000	14,000	14,000	28,000	15,000	13,000	28,000	27,000	13,000	0	15,000	27,000
Yearly taxable income	12,000	6,000	6,000	12,000	10,000	2,000		3,000	-3,000		25,000	13,000
The first JOD 10,000 is subject to PIT at 7%	700	420	420	10,000	700	140		210	0		700	700
The second JOD 10,000 is subject to PIT at 14%	280							0	0		1,400	420
The remaining balance of the yearly taxable income exceeding 20,000 JOD is subject to PIT at 20%								0	0		1,000	5,000
Total PIT	980	420	420	840	700	140	840	210	0	210	3,100	1,120
Net income	39,020	19,580	19,580	39,160	24,300	14,860	39,160	29,790	10,000	39,790	36,900	38,880
Tax share of net income	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.029	0.009	0.021	0.007	0.000	0.005	0.08	0.03
Tax share of gross income	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.028	0.009	0.021	0.007	0.000	0.005	0.08	0.03

